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“Facts prove that if corruption is allowed to spread, it will eventually lead to the destruction of a party and the fall of a government. . . .
Serious violations of Party discipline and state laws that have occurred inside our Party during the past few years are of a vile nature
and have produced shockingly harmful political consequences. . . .
All violations of Party discipline and state laws must be punished
without exception, and we shall not be soft in dealing with them.”
XI Jinping, November 20121

1. “Study, Disseminate and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National
Congress,” in Xi Jinping, The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014),
pp. 17-18.
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“When I grow up, I want to be . . . a corrupt official, because corrupt
officials have a lot of things.”
A six-year old schoolgirl in Guangzhou, September 20092
“It’s hard to be a good person in China. The system makes you numb
to what’s right and wrong. Companies bribe each other, passing on
the cost to customers, and use payoffs to cut corners, accelerate
growth or box out competitors.”
TAO Jun, an activist and former general manager of an Internet company
in Foshan, China, December 20083
“There’s not a single straight road in China; they were all built with
kickbacks. No one stays clean when traveling along these sparkling,
yet tainted roads. Corruption is the norm, it has become the unwritten law, an article of faith. It is everywhere. . . . No one can stay
clean. . . . Good luck to the person who tries to stay clean. . . . Not a
single person in China can completely break free from corruption,
and not a single road is straight.”
XUECUN Murong, May 20124

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Three Anti (Sanfan) and the Five Anti (Wufan) Campaigns
were initiated in 1951-1952 by MAO Zedong to curb corruption by the
“tigers” or corrupt senior officials and businessmen respectively.5 On the
other hand, the Anti-Corruption Campaign of 1963-1966 focused on petty corruption by targeting the “fleas” or lower-rank officials. At a highlevel meeting on these anti-corruption campaigns, Mao coined these
terms when he asserted that: “the more graft cases that are exposed, the
happier I am. Have you ever caught fleas on your body? The more you
catch, the more pleased you are.”6

2. Primary school students were asked by the Southern Metropolis Daily in Guangzhou
what they wanted to be when they grew up. See Joshua Keating, “I want to be a corrupt official when I grow up!” Foreign Policy, September 10, 2009.
3. Quoted in Mark Magnier, “Bribery and graft taint every facet of life in China,” Los
Angeles Times, December 29, 2008.
4. Murong Xuecun, “No roads are straight here,” New York Times, May 8, 2012.
5. These two campaigns are discussed in Section V.B below.
6. Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese
Communist Party (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 119.
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Sixty-three years later, the problem of corruption in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has not only remained unresolved but has become an intractable and “maddingly resilient”7 problem. This poses a serious threat to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as
reflected in the first quotation above by XI Jinping during the first group
study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CCP Central Committee
on November 17, 2012. The second quotation by the six-year old primary schoolgirl in Guangzhou brazenly admitting her ambition to be a corrupt official when she grows up reflects not only the Chinese population’s tolerance for corrupt officials but also their admiration for the
latter’s lavish lifestyle. Corruption is so widespread in China today that
LING Jiefeng, a historical fiction writer, has observed recently that children learn how to bribe teachers from an early age. For example, a child
attending kindergarten would inform his teacher that “my father works at
a coal company. Please let me know if you are short of coal.” 8 The third
and fourth quotations by TAO Jun and XUECUN Murong confirm that
corruption is “a way of life” in contemporary China. This means that corruption is rampant, occurring at all levels; thus making it the norm rather
than the exception.9
After becoming the General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of
the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the 18th Party Congress in
November 2012, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign to eliminate
the “tigers and flies” who had become rich through bribery and patronage.10 This campaign has been described by Anthony Saich of Harvard
University as the “most ambitious anti-corruption campaign since at least
Mao’s days.” Georgia State University’s Andrew Wedeman calls it the
“most sustained drive against high-level corruption” following the economic reforms of the early 1980s.11
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) of 2012, China was ranked 80th among 176 countries with a
score of 39/100. China’s performance did not improve significantly in
7. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s
Past, Current and Future Leaders, revised edition (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons [Asia],
2011), p. 180.
8. Nectar Gan, “Kindergarten corruption: Chinese author says even young children are
crooked,” South China Morning Post, March 12, 2015.
9. This useful distinction was introduced by Gerald E. Caiden in his article, “Public
Maladministration and Bureaucratic Corruption,” Hong Kong Journal of Public Administration, 3 (1) (June 1981): 58-62.
10. Matt Schiavenza, “Why Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is hollow, unserious,
and ultimately doomed,” The Atlantic, July 18, 2013.
11. Quoted in Shai Oster, “President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign biggest since Mao,”
Bloomberg Businessweek, March 4, 2014.
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2013 as it was ranked 80th among 177 countries with a score of 40/100.12
However, China’s ranking on the CPI dropped significantly from 80 th to
100th position in 2014 with a decrease in its score from 40 to 36.13 China’s unfavorable performance on the 2014 CPI was criticized by the
Global Times. The paper stated that the “20-place fall in ranking, which
does not in the slightest reflect how terrified China’s corrupt officials are
due to the anti-graft campaign, is barefaced mendacity.”14
Notwithstanding the Global Times’ criticism of China’s ranking on
the 2014 CPI as an “incredibly irresponsible ranking, which was made
through questionable working methods,”15 is China’s significant decline
in its CPI ranking and score from 2012 to 2014 a reflection that Xi’s anticorruption campaign is ineffective and not reaping the expected results?
This monograph addresses this question by evaluating the effectiveness
of Xi’s campaign during its first 28 months from my perspective as a
public administration scholar who has studied anti-corruption strategies
in many Asian countries for 38 years. My evaluation identifies the
strengths and weaknesses in Xi’s campaign and makes policy recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of China’s anti-corruption
strategy.16
This monograph is divided into seven sections. Following this introductory section, the second section provides a background analysis of

12. Details of China’s performance on the CPI from 1995-2014 are available at
http://www.transparency.org.
13. See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results for the CPI 2014 ranking and scores
for 175 countries.
14. See “Corruption index reflects West’s prejudice,” Global Times, December 5, 2014.
15. Ibid.
16. See Jon S.T. Quah, “Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative Analysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 13 (1)
(March 1982): 153-177; Jon S.T. Quah, “Singapore’s Experience in Curbing Corruption,” in
Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston and Victor T. LeVine (Eds.), Political Corruption:
A Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), Chapter 48, pp. 841-853;
Jon S.T. Quah, “Controlling Corruption in City-States: A Comparative Study of Hong Kong
and Singapore,” Crime, Law and Social Change, 22 (1995): 391-414; Jon S.T. Quah, “Responses to Corruption in Asian Societies,” in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston
(Eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2002), Chapter 28, pp. 513-532; Jon S.T. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asia: A
Comparative Study of Six Countries (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003); Jon S.T.
Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (Bingley: Emerald
Group Publishing, 2011); Jon S.T. Quah, Minimizing Corruption in China: Is this an Impossible Dream? (Baltimore, MD: Carey School of Law, University of Maryland, 2013); Jon S.T.
Quah, “Combating Corruption in Asian Countries: What Lessons have we Learnt?” Public
Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal, 16 (1) (Spring 2013): 15-34; and Jon S.T.
Quah, “Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five Asian Countries,”
Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (1) (January 2015): 143-159.

6

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

the chronic problem of corruption in China since the CCP assumed power in October 1949 after the Kuomintang (KMT) government’s defeat
and escape to the island of Taiwan. The third section focuses on XI
Jinping and analyzes his family background and education, and explains
his rise to power within the CCP so as to understand his objectives in initiating the anti-corruption campaign after assuming power. Before describing and evaluating Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in sections five
and six, it is necessary to provide background information in the fourth
section on the four anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), which constitute the
other important component of China’s anti-corruption strategy. The concluding section identifies the weaknesses of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and provides some suggestions for enhancing anti-corruption efforts in China. Indeed, China will not succeed in curbing the systemic
problem of corruption if it continues to rely on ineffective ACAs and implement anti-corruption campaigns which target political opponents rather than address the underlying causes of corruption.
II. ANALYZING CHINA’S SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION
PROBLEM
A.

Corruption and the Dynastic Cycle

The various dynasties in China from the Shang Dynasty (1600 to
1000 B.C.) to the Ch’ing or Qing Dynasty (A.D. 1644 to 1911) were
plagued with corruption, which was also an important contributing factor
to their decline. The periodic rise and fall of China’s rulers and dynasties, described as the dynastic cycle, can be attributed to these four causes: “oppressive land taxes, especially those imposed on peasants; an increase in government corruption; inadequate protection of the people;
and the inability of the regime to provide for the people in times of distress.”17 There were five stages in the dynastic cycle: “(1) the establishment of a new virtuous and benevolent ruler; (2) a period of intellectual
rejuvenation; (3) an era of corruption and misrule; (4) the occurrence of
uncontrolled natural calamities, such as floods and/or droughts; and finally, (5) overthrow of the regime by rebellion or invasions.”18
YE Feng, the Director-General of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), one of China’s four ACAs,
blames rampant corruption for the fall of many dynasties. According to

17. Elizabeth Freund Larus, Politics and Society in Contemporary China (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), p. 16.
18. James C.F. Wang, Comparative Asian Politics: Power, Policy, and Change (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994), p. 19.
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Ye, “the founding emperors created the empire out of hardship and
through hard work, but their descendants lost the empire because of corruption.” Consequently, many anti-corruption measures were initiated to
curb corruption in China. But “throughout history, they failed more often than succeeded in the fight against corruption, and no dynasty ever
escaped the cycle of rise and fall which was linked to the phenomenon of
corruption.”19
In short, an important historical trend in China was the dynastic cycle in which corruption was a major cause for the decline and overthrow
of the various dynasties. While China’s current political leaders wish to
distance themselves from China’s imperial past, Carolyn Hsu argues that
these aspects of corruption discourse in late imperial China – namely,
“the moral mandate of the ruling regime, the power of the corruption
charge, and the different degrees of acceptable and unacceptable fubai
[corruption]” – resonate and “live on” in China today.20 Orville Schell
reminded us recently that the CCP leaders are concerned with combating
corruption because of their “deep and frightening historical awareness”
of “how dynasties and the Kuomintang fell due to uncontrolled corruption.”21
B.

Corruption and Low Salaries of Officials in Imperial China

In 59 B.C., Emperor Hsuan (73 to 48 B.C.) issued an edict to increase by 50 percent the salaries of minor officials ranking 100 shih or
less so as to prevent them from becoming corrupt. Emperor Ch’eng followed suit in 7 B.C. by raising the salaries of officials ranking 300 shih
or less in 7 B.C.22 The “unrealistically low salaries” of public officials in
11th century China was a major cause of the corruption of the lower level
bureaucrats. The low salaries of the junior officials of the Song Dynasty
(A.D. 960 to 1279) were increased during the early years, but the situation deteriorated by the middle of the 11th century because of the increased growth of the bureaucracy and the fact that the officials were on-

19. Ye Feng, “The Chinese Procuratorate and the Anti-Corruption Campaigns in the People’s Republic of China,” in Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li and Jan Michiel Otto (Eds.), Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002),
pp. 113-114.
20. Carolyn L. Hsu, Corruption and Morality in the People’s Republic of China (Bloomington, IN: Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern
China, No. 8, Spring 1996), p. 11.
21. Quoted in “How serious is Xi Jinping in tackling corruption in China?” The Atlantic,
June 28, 2013.
22. Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1980), p. 125.
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ly paid for three out of the six or seven years of service. Consequently,
these officials were forced to supplement their income by engaging in
private trade, which “led easily and too frequently to the misappropriation of state property and the abuse of official position through venality
and improbity of other kinds.”23
The low salaries of civil servants constituted a major cause of the
corruption during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and Ch’ing or Qing
Dynasty (1644-1911). Since three-quarters of government revenue during the Ming Dynasty came from the land tax, the reduction in tax revenues resulted in a drastic reduction in the salaries of civil servants. In
1392, the salary schedule of civil servants was introduced, but by the 15 th
century their salaries continued to decline in value because half of their
salaries were paid in grain, and the other half in such commodities as silk
fabrics, cotton cloth, pepper and sapanwood. In 1432, some officials
were paid with confiscated garments and salvaged materials, and by
1472, peas were also used as payment. By the mid-1440s, half of the salaries of officials were unpaid.24
Pierre-Etienne Will has attributed the corruption in late imperial
China to “insufficient salaries” and “loyalty to one’s family, ancestors,
and native place.”25 The nominal salaries of the officials were woefully
inadequate to meet their nine types of public and private expenses.26
Apart from unavoidable expenses such as family upkeep and employing
private secretaries and servants, officials were also expected to contribute
to charities or public works for political expediency, and to provide gifts
and entertainment to their superiors to enhance their prospects for pro-

23. E.A. Kracke, Jr., Civil Service in Early Sung China: 960-1067 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1953), p. 83.
24. Shawn Ni and Pham Hoang Van, High Corruption Income in Ming and Qing China
(Columbia, MO: Department of Economics, University of Missouri, Working Paper 503, February 2005), pp. 4-5.
25. Pierre-Etienne Will, “Officials and Money in Late Imperial China: State Finances,
Private Expectations, and the Problem of Corruption in a Changing Environment,” in Emmanuel Kreike and William Chester Jordan (Eds.), Corrupt Histories (Rochester, NY: University
of Rochester Press, 2004), pp. 52-53.
26. The six public expenses of the officials were: (1) travel expenses to reach their posts
after appointment at the capital, and later on special missions; (2) repayment of debts incurred
at the capital before reaching their posts; (3) salaries of private staff; (4) contributions to charities, grants of start-up money for local projects; (5) “reciprocities” (yingchou), for meeting social obligations, delivering customary gifts to their superiors, and entertaining visiting colleagues, especially superiors; and (6) meeting the demands for funding and fees from the
higher echelons, either customary or extortionary. The officials’ private expenses were: (1)
living expenses and upkeep of family and servants in their posts and at home; (2) extra money
representing “savings” for their retirement; and (3) demands from relatives at home for common expenses and charities. Ibid., p. 32.
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motion. Since the local officials could not meet their public and private
expenses with their salaries, they were compelled to engage in corrupt
activities. Consequently, the Yongzheng emperor introduced the “integrity-nourishing” (yanglian) allowance in 1723, which multiplied their
basic salaries by 10, 20 or more times, in order to help the local officials
survive and perform their duties without resorting to alternative sources
of revenue.27
C.

Corruption during the Republican Period (1912-1949)

After the Japanese troops surrendered in Tientsin on October 6,
1945, the officials of the Chungking government reasserted control over
areas held by the Japanese by taking over the property and assets of the
Japanese and their collaborators. However, the takeover process became
“a racket with official position treated as an opportunity rather than a responsibility” because the supervisors were “favorites, relatives, or close
political allies of the Generalissimo.”28 Corruption was widespread because the government failed to provide “any equitable and orderly means
for disposing of enemy property,” and the absence of institutional safeguards resulted in “the path to corruption” since there was no “overall
plan or coordinated policy delineating what was to be taken over by
whom.”29
Since corruption prevailed in China during the Republican period,
“it was common for individuals to take advantage of their official position first to occupy a building and then to manipulate things in such a
way as to have the building sold to them.”30 An investigating committee
found that “offenders down to the soldiers [were] using the resources of
the country as their personal property.” The KMT officials believed that
“as public functionaries they had suffered so much hardship and privation in the interior during the seven years of war that they had a right to
indulge themselves.”31 Consequently, “the web of corruption that had
spread through Nationalist China eroded the [KMT] regime’s ability to
defend itself.”32

27. Ibid., pp. 31 and 34.
28. Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle
for Postwar Asia (New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 58-59.
29. Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 16-17.
30. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire, p. 59.
31. Ibid., p. 60.
32. Keith Maguire, “Modernization and Clean Government: Tackling Crime, Corruption
and Organized Crime in Modern Taiwan,” Crime, Law and Social Change, 28 (1) (1997): 76.
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The civil service was ineffective since the low salaries made the
junior officials vulnerable to corruption. In 1934, CHIANG Kai-shek
launched the New Life Movement in order to encourage the promotion
of more traditional moral virtues, and “to fight against entrenched attitudes of graft and corruption.”33 However, in June 1945, the KMT was
plagued by factional struggles, corruption and low morale.34 The bureaucracy during the Republican period was “permeated with corruption” because there was “a wilful perversion of formal laws and procedures by
the holders of public office for the sole purpose of their own and their
families’ private gain – from the center down to the lowest pao and chia
official.”35
The rampant corruption in mainland China under CHIANG Kaishek’s government was a major reason for the KMT’s defeat by the CCP
in October 1949. Keith Maguire has highlighted the significant differences in the level of corruption between the CCP controlled and KMT
controlled areas. The Communists in the red base areas paid for the food
they took and were polite and friendly to the peasants. However, looting
was widespread in the KMT areas since their troops were poorly paid
and had low morale. Consequently, the population favored the Communists and “had no particular sympathy for the KMT.”36
In analyzing the CCP’s victory over the KMT, James E. Sheridan
observed that unlike the excellent Communist leadership, the incompetent and corrupt KMT generals stole and sold government property,
sometimes to the Communists.37 The morale of the KMT’s army was “at
rock bottom” because their soldiers were “inadequately paid and fed;
training was poor to non-existent; discipline was bad; the rank and file
did not know what they were fighting for, and thus, saw no reason to
fight.” By contrast, there was high morale among the Communist soldiers because they were “well cared for, well trained, [and] thoroughly
indoctrinated about the need and purpose of the struggle.”38 Finally, the
Communists were also favored by the peasants because they “instituted
honest government” and initiated political and economic reforms that
benefited the peasants.39

33. Keith Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 23.
34. Ibid., p. 32.
35. Pepper, Civil War in China, p. 147. The local administrative unit, chia, consists of 6
to 15 families, and a pao comprises 6 to 15 chia (p. xi).
36. Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan, p. 29.
37. James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History
1912-1949 (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 272.
38. Ibid., p. 273.
39. Ibid., p. 274.
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Corruption in China after 1949

Most China watchers agree that corruption in China during the past
65 years can be divided into two phases: Mao’s era, from 1949 to 1976
and the post-Mao era, after the introduction of DENG Xiaoping’s “open
door” policy in 1978.40 While the CCP’s aversion towards corruption
was responsible for its victory over the corrupt KMT government in October 1949, MAO Zedong was concerned that corruption would be the
most serious problem facing the CCP because it had inherited the KMT’s
administrative apparatus and its “deeply entrenched bureaucratism.”41 In
1950, the CCP, alarmed at the corrupt behavior of veteran cadres, reprimanded them for their lavish lifestyles and engaging in corrupt behavior
such as “extramarital affairs, divorcing wives of peasant backgrounds to
marry young, educated urban girls, and sexual harassment.” In Beijing,
79 veteran cadres (12 percent) were among the 650 persons involved in
corruption during 1949-1951. In contrast, the problem was more serious
in Shanghai as 319 CCP members had committed graft in 1950.42
While corruption was a problem in China during the 27 years under
Mao, its magnitude pales in comparison to the exponential growth of corruption cases during the post-Mao era. Based on the amount of bribes involved, the scale of corruption has increased exponentially from 100,000
yuan per case in the late 1970s to millions of yuan per case in the late
1990s.43 Deng’s “open door” policy gave rise to many corrupt practices
and rampant smuggling in Fujian, Zheijiang and Guangdong provinces.
The number of corruption cases in China increased in the early 1980s,
continued to grow in the 1980s and 1990s, and involved both larger sums
of money and more senior officials too.44
By analyzing the data collected on the corruption cases investigated
by the procuratorates in China from 1980-2000 from their yearbooks and
other sources, Melanie Manion found that among the 736,473 cases investigated, there were 404,548 cases (55 percent) involving embezzle-

40. There is a wealth of literature on corruption in China after 1949. The most useful
sources are: Lu, Cadres and Corruption; Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building
Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2004); Qingli Meng, Corruption in Transitional China: A 33-Year Study (Oisterwijk:
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2013); Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); and Andrew Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid
Growth and Rising Corruption in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
41. Wedeman, Double Paradox, p. 89.
42. Lu, Cadres and Corruption, pp. 35-36.
43. Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of
Governance in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 219.
44. Manion, Corruption by Design, pp. 84-85.
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ment of public assets, 207,153 cases (28 percent) of bribery, and 124,778
cases (17 percent) of misuse of public funds.45 This means that the Chinese procuratorates had investigated an average of 35,070 cases per year
during these two decades. China’s economic environment after the implementation of Deng’s “open door” policy in December 1978 was conducive for the rapid growth of corruption because of “more opportunities, higher payoffs, weaker enforcement, and lower psychic costs for
officials choosing to engage in corruption.”46 The five “most common
and serious forms of corruption” during the post-Mao period were “bureaucratic commerce, predatory exactions, corrupt exchanges, use of
public funds as private capital, and illegal privatization of state enterprise
assets.”47
III. XI JINPING’S CAREER AND RISE TO POLITICAL POWER
A.

Family Background and Education

XI Jinping was born on June 15, 1953 in the north western province
of Shaanxi. His father, XI Zhongxun, was a revolutionary hero who had
faithfully served MAO Zedong, but was purged by him and publicly
stripped of his positions and humiliated in 1962. In January 1969, when
XI Jinping was 15 years old, he was sent to a small, remote mountain village of Liangjiahe in Wenan township of Yanchuan county in Shaanxi
Province for “re-education” as part of Mao’s “Down to the Countryside”
Movement. He was part of the group known as “the children of black
gang” or heibang, referring to those who preferred capitalism to socialism.48 He lived in a cave house for the next seven years cutting hay, reaping wheat and herding sheep as a member of a local work unit during the
day, and reading “thick books in the dim light of kerosene lamps” at
night. He worked hard and earned the respect of his older colleagues,
who also admired his personal modesty and endurance.49
Consequently, in 1972 Xi became responsible for party-line education at the age of 19. One year later, he was appointed party secretary of
his production brigade. He initiated a biogas program for cooking to alleviate energy shortages and led his commune members in building dams
45. Ibid., p. 88, Table 3.1.
46. Ibid., p. 94.
47. Ibid., p. 96. For a comprehensive analysis of these five forms of corruption, see ibid.,
pp. 97-110.
48. Xi Jinping, Son of Yellow Earth, reproduced as an Appendix in Lance L.P. Gore,
“Deciphering the two abrupt turns of the Xi Jinping regime,” EAI Background Brief, No. 890
(Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, January 27, 2014), p. 15.
49. Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think, p. 413.
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and fixing ditches. Xi was recommended to study at Tsinghua (or Qinghua) University in 1975 even though he had only a primary school education50 and received a grand send-off by the whole village when he left
for his studies. The seven years of hard rural village life in Shaanxi were
responsible for his practical orientation and enabled him to retain “his
common man’s touch.”51
Xi admitted that many of his “practical ideas stem from my life during that period, which has influenced me every minute, even till today.
To truly understand the common folk and society is the most fundamental thing.”52 He was also influenced by his family from an early age in
“building comradeship with people around” him. His father taught him
about solidarity and encouraged him to seek and forge unity with other
people.53 The most important difficulty Xi had to overcome during his
seven years of living in the countryside was changing his mindset by
learning the “peasants’ honest and practical ways and their spirit of hard
work.”54 Xi admitted that his “seven years of living in the countryside
have benefited me tremendously” and enabled him to “forge deep bonds
with the masses and laid the foundation for my growth and progress.”55
The first foreign leader that Xi met in Beijing in November 2007 after his promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) was the
late LEE Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister from June 1959 to
November 1990. Lee’s first impression of Xi was highly favorable as he
described him as “a man of great breadth – what the Chinese call da qi,
as opposed to xiao qi.” Xi is also “not narrow-minded” and “thinks
through a problem deeply and he does not want to show off his
knowledge.” He has gravitas and considering his trials and tribulations in
Shaanxi Province in 1969 as a young man “working his way slowly back
up, never complaining, never grumbling,” Lee “would put him in the
Nelson Mandela class of persons.”56
In short, Xi’s personality emphasizes “perseverance, restraint, circumspection, and [a] low-key profile.” Furthermore, his governance style
is “down-to-earth, determined but shrewd in political maneuvering, never
pushy but yet skilful.” During his first two years in office, Xi has consol50. Hsin-Chi Kuan, China under the New Leadership (Baltimore, MD: Carey School of
Law, University of Maryland, 2013), p. 3.
51. Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think, p. 414.
52. Quoted in ibid., p. 414.
53. Xi, Son of Yellow Earth, p. 16.
54. Ibid., p. 15.
55. Ibid., p. 16.
56. Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2013),
p. 28.
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idated his power by following the established rules and “through a delicate struggle of side-lining skeptics and placing [his] supporters in important positions.”57 As a princeling, Xi is “less guarded” than HU Jintao
and has “the space to act, communicate, and relate to people with a confidence that comes from living a life in which power and resources naturally flowed his way.” Xi has also “experienced both palace life and
peasant toil” and according to his peers, Xi’s experience in Liangjiahe
has given him “an earthy pragmatism that distinguishes him from Hu,
who was raised on Communist Party ideology and spent his working life
inside the party machine.”58
Xi studied Chemical Engineering at Tsinghua University in Beijing
as a “Worker, Peasant, PLA [People’s Liberation Army]” student
(gongnongbing xuesheng) and graduated in 1979 at the age of 26.59 During his four years at Tsinghua University, Xi focused on basic organic
synthesis and was a classmate of CHEN Xi.60 As Xi completed junior
middle school lessons and devoted most of his time on revolutionary activities rather than attending classes, he encountered problems with
mathematics, chemistry and physics, and began to show more interest in
history and literature.61 LIU Cuiquin, Xi’s former teacher at Tsinghua,
said that he was hard working, excelled in sports, and “had a lovely heart
and was respectful and caring to the teachers and other students.”62
After his graduation in 1979, Xi did not keep in touch with his alma
mater and classmates until the 1990s, when Tsinghua University became
a “pilgrimage place” for politicians and CHEN Xi was the Secretary of
the CCP Tsinghua University Committee.63 As the Governor of Fujian
Province, Xi began his study for a Doctor of Law degree in Marxist Theory and Ideological and Political Education at the School of Humanities
and Social Sciences (SHSS) at Tsinghua University. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on “Research on the Rural Marketization of China” under the supervision of LIU Meixun, the Director of the Institute of Economics at SHSS at Tsinghua University. He received his doctorate in
57. Kuan, China under the New Leadership, p. 4.
58. John Garnaut, “The Creation Myth of Xi Jinping: What do we really know about China’s new leader?” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2012.
59. Joseph Fewsmith, “China’s Ruling Elite: The Politburo and Central Committee,” in
Larry Wortzel and Andrew Scobell (Eds.), Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutions,
and Ideas after the 16th National Party Congress (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Company,
2004), p. 87.
60. Wu Ming, China’s Future: A Biography of Xi Jinping (Hong Kong: CNHK Publications Ltd., 2012), p. 68.
61. Ibid., p. 71.
62. Quoted in ibid., p. 72.
63. Ibid., pp. 68 and 88.
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2002 but questions were raised by critics on how he was able to get a
doctorate without a master’s degree, without attending classes in Beijing
when he was based in Fuzhou, and how he was able to write his dissertation in spite of his busy schedule as the Governor of Fujian Province.64
However, his doctoral dissertation was revised and published later by the
People’s Publishing House and was favorably reviewed by LU Liangshu,
former Dean of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and by
HAN Juan, Director of the Department of Research on Rural Economy
of the Development Research Center of the State Council.65
Table 1: Qinghua Graduates in the 17th Central Committee
(October 2007)
Name

Home
Province
Shanghai
Anhui
Jiangsu
Jiangsu
Beijing
Hebei

Year
of
Birth
1945
1942
1940
1945
1950
1945

Year of
Joining
CCP
1975
1964
1961
1964
1973
1964

CHEN Yuan
HU Jintao
HUA Jianmin
LIU Yandong
LOU Jiwei
TIAN
Chengping
WU Bangguo
XI Jinping
ZHOU Ji
ZHOU
Xiaochuan

Anhui
Shaanxi
Shanghai
Jiangsu

1941
1953
1946
1948

1964
1974
NA
1986

Department

Automatic Control
Water Conservancy
Power
Chemical Engineering
Computer Science
Civil Architecture
Radio Electronics
Chemical Engineering
Precision Instruments
Economic
Management

Period in
Qinghua
University
1964-1970
1959-1965
1957-1963
1964-1970
1978-1982
1962-1968
1960-1967
1975-1979
1964-1970
1980-1985

Source: Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization (Singapore:
World Scientific Publishing, 2010), p. 138, Table 4.2.

The “Qinghua Clique” has declined from 20 members in the 16 th
Central Committee to 10 members in the 17th Central Committee because
of retirement.66 Table 1 provides details of the Qinghua Clique in the 17th
Central Committee and shows that Xi is the youngest member from
Shaanxi Province and one of the two chemical engineering graduates.
Apart from being a Qinghua graduate, Xi is among the 52 members of
the 17th Central Committee with PhD degrees.67 As mentioned earlier, he
also studied Marxist philosophy in an on-the-job postgraduate program at
64. Ibid., pp. 88-91.
65. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
66. Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization (Singapore:
World Scientific Publishing, 2010), p. 137.
67. Ibid., p. 56.

16

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Tsinghua University’s SHSS from 1998 to 2002 and obtained a Doctor
of Law (LLD) degree in 2002 at the age of 48.68
As his father, XI Zhongxun, was a vice premier of the State Council
from April 1959 to October 1962 and a key ally of DENG Xiaoping, XI
Jinping is also one of the 25 “princelings” (taizidang or children of former senior CCP officials) in the 17th Central Committee.69 Table 2 identifies the nine members of the 17th PSC in October 2007. It should be
noted that Xi is the only PSC member who is one of the six members of
the 17th Secretariat.70
Table 2: The 17th Politburo Standing Committee (October 2007)
Name

Year of
Birth

Age

Home
Province

Prior Party
Position

Membership

HU Jintao

1942

65

Anhui

16th PSC member

Old

th

WU Bangguo

1941

66

Anhui

16 PSC member

Old

WEN Jiabao

1942

65

Tianjin

16th PSC member

Old

th

JIA Qinglin

1940

67

Hebei

16 PSC member

Old

LI Changchun

1944

63

Liaoning

16th PSC member

Old

XI Jinping

1953

54

Shaanxi

Shanghai Party
Secretary

New

LI Keqiang

1955

52

Anhui

Liaoning Party
Secretary

New

HE Guoqiang

1943

64

Hunan

16th Politburo
member

New

ZHOU
Yongkang

1942

65

Jiangsu

16th Politburo
member

New

Source: Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 21, Table 1.1.

B.

Administrative and Political Experience

XI Jinping and LI Keqiang were promoted to the 17th PSC in October 2007 as candidates of the fifth generation leadership in China. Xi was
transferred to Zheijiang as acting governor on October 12, 2002, after
serving as acting governor and governor of Fujian from August 1999 to
October 2002. He was promoted to Party Secretary of Zheijiang on No68. Zheng Yongnian and Chen Gang, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” China: An International Journal, 7 (1) (March 2009): 24, fn. 51 and 30.
69. Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 140, Table 4.3.
70. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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vember 21, 2002, and transferred to Shanghai as Party Secretary in
March 2007 to replace HAN Zheng, the acting Party Secretary.71 Table
3 provides details of the various positions held by Xi from 1979-2012.
Table 3: Positions held by Xi Jinping, 1979-2013
No.
1

Period
1979-1982

2
3
4

1982
1982-1983
1983-1985

5

1985-1988

6

1988-1990

7
8

1990-1995
1990-1996

9
10
11

1992-1997
1995-2002
1996-2000

12
13
14

1997-2002
1998-2003
1998-2002

15

1999-2002

16

1999-2003

17
18
19

1999-2000
2000-2002
2001-2002

20

2002-2003

21

2002-2007

22

2002

23
24
25

2002-2003
2002-2007
2002-2007

71. Ibid., p. 23.

Position
Secretary of the General Offices of the State Council and
Central Military Commission
Secretary to GENG Biao
Deputy Party Secretary, Zhengding County, Hebei Province
Party Secretary and First Political Commissar, Chinese People’s
Armed Police Force, Zhengding County, Hebei Province
Executive Vice-Mayor of Xiamen and Member of Party City
Committee and Standing Committee, Xiamen, Fujian Province
Party Secretary, Prefectural Committee, Ningde Prefecture and
First Secretary, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Nanjing
Military Region, Fujian Military District, Fujian Province
Chairman, City People’s Congress, Fuzhou, Fujian Province
First Secretary, PLA, Nanjing Military Region, Fujian Military
District, and Party Secretary, City Committee, Fuzhou, Fujian
Province
Delegate, 14th Party National Congress
Deputy Party Secretary, Provincial Committee, Fujian Province
First Political Commissioner, PLA, Services and Arms, Reserve
Artillery Division, Fujian Province
Alternate Member, 15th Party Central Committee
Deputy, 9th National People’s Congress
Graduate Student, Humanities Department,
Tsinghua University, Beijing
Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization Committee,
Provincial Level, Fujian Province
Deputy Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization
Committee, City Level, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province
Acting Governor, People’s Government, Fujian Province
Governor, People’s Government, Fujian Province
Member, Party Provincial Committee and Standing Committee,
Fujian Province
Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization Committee,
Provincial Level, Zheijiang Province
First Secretary, PLA, Regions, Nanjing Military Region, Zheijiang Military District, Party Committee, Zheijiang Province
Deputy Party Secretary, Provincial Committee,
Zheijiang Province
Acting Governor, People’s Government, Zheijiang Province
Party Secretary, Provincial Committee, Zheijiang Province
Member, 16th Party Central Committee
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26

2003-2007

27
28
29

March
2007
2007-2012
2007-2012

30

2007-2012

31

2008-2013

32

2010-2012

33
34

2010-2013
November
2012

Chairman, Provincial People’s Congress and Standing
Committee, Zheijiang Province
Party Secretary, Municipal Committee, Shanghai Municipality
President, Party Central Committee, Central Party School
Member, 17th Party Central Committee Politburo, Standing
Committee and Secretariat
Vice-Chairman, 17th Party Central Committee, Taiwan Affairs
Leading Small Group and Chairman, 17th Party Central
Committee Party Building Leading Small Group
Vice-President, People’s Government, People’s Republic of
China
Vice-Chairman, 17th Party Central Committee, Central Military
Commission
Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission, PRC
Secretary-General, 18th Party National Congress, General Secretary, 18th Party Central Committee and Member,
18th Party Central Committee Central Military Commission,
Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee

Source: Compiled from China Vitae at
http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Xi_Jinping/full (accessed 18 March 2015).

Xi’s promotion to the 17th PSC was based on “careful selection and
deliberation.” A survey of a random sample of 400 senior officials by the
Central Organization Department was conducted in January 2007 to ascertain their views on social issues and to collect public opinion on candidates for the position of Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi performed well
on this poll and was appointed to the position two months later.72 Contrary to expectations, Xi’s appointment as Shanghai Party Secretary in
March 2007 did not prevent him from being promoted to the 17 th PSC.
He was promoted because of his selection by 400 officials surveyed on
June 25, 2007 to identify candidates for the 17th PSC from a pool of 200
candidates below 63 years old with the rank of a minister or a chief military region officer. LI Keqiang was HU Jintao’s protégé but Xi was
placed ahead of Li because of his higher score on the survey. Xi’s position as the heir apparent to Hu was consolidated in March 2008 with his
election as the Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).73
Xi was not appointed as the first Vice-Chairman of the CMC in October
2007 because he needed more time before becoming involved in military
affairs.74

72. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
73. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
74. Ibid., p. 43.
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Explaining Xi’s Meteoric Rise to Power

In his autobiography, Son of Yellow Earth, Xi revealed that he had
submitted eight applications to join the Communist Youth League before
he was accepted. Similarly, he was only admitted into the CCP in 1974
and made the brigade party secretary only after submitting his tenth application for membership because his previous nine applications were rejected due to his family background and based on the fact that his father
XI Zhongxun was purged by Mao during the Cultural Revolution.75
After graduating with a degree in Chemical Engineering from
Tsinghua University in 1979, Xi’s first position was Secretary of the
General Offices of the State Council and CMC. In October 2007, 28
years later, Xi was appointed as one of the nine members of the 17 th PSC.
In other words, Xi was promoted to the 17th PSC as a member of China’s
fifth generation leadership 33 years after joining the CCP in 1974. During 1982-2013, Xi has held 17 positions, with an average of less than two
years in each position. Xi’s fast-track career is the result of his “mastery
of the political tricks necessary to move forward in good and opportune
times.”76
What are the reasons for Xi’s rapid rise to political power from
1974 to his appointment as the CCP’s General Secretary in November
2012? First, Xi’s background as a princeling was not a disadvantage because during his seven years of hardship living in the Shaanxi countryside Xi acquired the ability to relate with the masses. His wealth of grassroots experience put him in good standing and gave Xi the edge over his
closest competitor, LI Keqiang, who lacked such experience.77 Zheng
and Chen contend that Xi’s “abundant local grass-roots working experience” in northern Hebei, southeastern Fujian, eastern Zheijiang, and
Shanghai from 1982 to 2007 was an important asset because in contrast
Li remained in Beijing until he was transferred in 1998 from the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League to Henan Province
to serve as the Deputy Party Secretary.78
Second, Xi’s strong ties with the military constituted an important
asset for his climb to the top. His father’s “closest old comrade-in-arms”
was GENG Biao, who was appointed as the Secretary General of the
CMC in January 1979. He was also a Politburo member from August
1977 and a Vice-Premier of the State Council from March 1978.
75. Xi, Son of Yellow Earth, p. 18.
76. Kuan, China under the New Leadership, p. 4.
77. For details of Li’s background, see Wu Ming and Lin Zheng, China’s Road: A Biography of Li Keqiang (Hong Kong: CNHK Publications, 2012).
78. Zheng and Chen, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” 10.
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Through his father’s friendship with Geng, Xi was offered the position of
Geng’s personal secretary in the CMC’s General Office. As Geng’s personal secretary, Xi was a member of Geng’s government delegation
when they visited Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden in May 1979,
and he also accompanied Geng and his military delegation to the United
States from May 25 to June 6, 1980.79 Xi left his position at the CMC’s
General Office in July 1981 when GENG Biao was succeeded by YANG
Shangkun as the CMC’s Secretary General.80
Table 3 shows that Xi’s ties with the PLA are further reflected in his
occupancy of these positions: First Secretary, PLA, Nanjing Military Region in Fujian Province (1988-1996); First Political Commissioner, PLA,
Services and Arms, Reserve Artillery Division, Fujian Province (19962000); Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization Committee
(NDMC), Provincial Level, Fujian Province (1999-2002); Deputy Director, PLA, NDMC, City Level, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province (1999-2003);
Director, PLA, NDMC, Provincial Level, Zheijiang Province (20022003); and First Secretary, PLA, Regions, Nanjing Military Region,
Zheijiang Military District, Party Committee, Zheijiang Province (20022007).
Xi’s close ties with the PLA are cemented by the support he has received from the CMC’s Vice-Chairmen, General GUO Boxiong and
General XU Caihou,81 both of whom were loyal to former President
JIANG Zemin, who was the CMC’s Chairman from November 1989 to
September 2004. They have demonstrated their support for Xi on many
occasions since his appointment as the CMC’s Vice-Chairman in October 2010.82 Xi’s other source of military support comes from these three
“princeling generals”: General LIU Yuan (son of LIU Shaoqi), General
LIU Yanzhou (son of LIU Jiande), and General ZHANG Haiyang (son of
General ZHANG Zhen). As a close friend of Xi in the PLA, General LIU
Yuan is also committed to fighting corruption.83
Third, Xi has valuable administrative experience as Governor of Fujian Province (2000-2002) and Acting Governor of Zheijiang Province
(2002-2003). More importantly, he has also risen rapidly within the CCP

79. Bo Zhiyue, “Xi Jinping and his Military Ties,” EAI Background Brief, No. 702 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, March 1, 2012), p. 3.
80. Ibid., p. 4.
81. General Xu, former vice-chairman of the CMC, was expelled from the CCP in June
2014 and handed over to the prosecutors in October 2014 on corruption charges. See Liu Sha,
“No one untouchable after downfall of Zhou Yongkang: PLA paper,” Global Times, December
18, 2014.
82. Bo, “Xi Jinping and his Military Ties,” pp. 4-5.
83. Ibid., pp. 6-9.
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as can be seen from his various positions as Party Secretary in Zhengding
County, Hebei Province (1983-1985); Party Secretary in Ningde Prefecture, Fujian Province (1988-1990); Delegate at the 14th Party National
Congress (1992-1997); Party Secretary in Fuzhou, Fujian Province
(1990-1996); Alternate Member of the 15th Party Central Committee
(1997-2002); Deputy of 9th National People’s Congress (1998-2003);
Party Secretary, Provincial Committee, Zheijiang Province (2002-2007);
Member of 16th Party Central Committee (2002-2007); and Party Secretary, Municipal Committee, Shanghai Municipality from March 2007 until his promotion to the PSC in October 2007.
The final reason for Xi’s rapid climb within the CCP hierarchy is
his incorruptible reputation and commitment to combating corruption
within and outside the CCP. Xi’s performance in Fujian and Zheijiang
Provinces facilitated his entry into the Political Bureau. Xi’s 17 years in
Fujian Province first as Vice-Mayor of Xiamen in 1985 to later serving
as the Governor from 2000 to 2002 were significant because he was responsible for helping Fujian Province recover from the Yuanhua smuggling scandal.84 Similarly, Xi was moved in March 2007 to Shanghai to
replace CHEN Liangyu, who was jailed for his role in the pension fund
scandal, as Party Secretary. Xi’s clean reputation enabled him to clean up
Shanghai by requiring its officials to declare their assets.85
When he was 35, Xi’s first attempt to combat corruption occurred
after his appointment as the Party Secretary for the Ningde Prefecture in
May 1988. Ningde was a poverty-stricken prefecture of 14,000 square
kilometers with a population of about three million and a per capita income of RMB160.86 Xi’s difficult task was to improve the poverty and
poor infrastructure in Ningde Prefecture. The three major life events in
East Fujian were building a house, funerals and weddings. Xi found that
7,392 cadres had built private houses in the area since 1982, including
242 cadres above vice county level and 1,399 cadres above section level.
One cadre spent RMB100,000 to build a 300 square meters house, which
was beyond his official income. Before Xi’s arrival, the Ningde Prefectural Party Committee investigated this problem three times but without
any positive results as the housing construction continued unabated.87
Xi began to curb the “roadside corruption” by demolishing the
buildings and investigating and prosecuting those officials responsible
for their construction. He restricted housing construction with “an iron

84.
85.
86.
87.

Zheng and Chen, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” 11.
Ibid., 12.
Wu, China’s Future: A Biography of Xi Jinping, p. 178.
Ibid., p. 190.
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hand” and made inspection breakthroughs by “cracking the hard nut, attacking the negative models, and demolishing the diehard.”88 Xi’s first
anti-corruption campaign won public support in East Fujian and was endorsed by ZHANG Mingqing, Head of the Fujian Journalist Station of
the People’s Daily, who submitted a report titled “Investigating on Cadres’ Violating Discipline to Build Houses in Ningde, Fujian” to the CCP
Central Committee and the State Council for Internal Reference. The report was subsequently published as an article in the People’s Daily titled
“A good deed wins thousands of people”, which made Xi’s anticorruption campaign in Ningde famous.89
In sum, XI Jinping succeeded HU Jintao because of his acceptability to the CCP’s various factions in view of “his special family background, unique personal experience and low-profile, open-minded characteristics”90 as well as his strong ties with the military, extensive
administrative and experience, and honest reputation. Xi’s “biggest redeeming quality is that he has managed to rise up the party hierarchy
without creating major waves, getting caught up in any major scandals,
or creating too many enemies.” Like Hu, Xi is “a good consensus candidate for party secretary, because although he is probably not anyone’s
first choice, he is at least acceptable to a wide range of cadres.” 91 Similarly, Gordon Chang contends that Xi was selected because he “appealed
to factions” as he was not identified with any faction, and was “essentially, the least unacceptable candidate.”92 The event that confirmed Xi’s
selection as Hu’s successor was his successful management of the Beijing Olympic Games in August 2008, which was his first political test
after his appointment as the PRC’s Vice-President in October 2007.93
Perhaps, the best explanation for Xi’s selection as Hu’s successor is
provided by Kerry Brown, who attributes Xi’s success to his extensive
membership of the five networks of family, military, business, provincial
and elite support. Unlike his six colleagues in the 18th PSC, “the political

88. Ibid., pp. 190-191.
89. Ibid., p. 191.
90. Zheng and Chen, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” 9.
91. Melanie Hart, China’s Real Leadership Question (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, August 16, 2012), p. 23.
92. Gordon G. Chang, “China’s Next Mao,” Journal of International Security Affairs, 25
(Fall/Winter 2013): 7.
93. See Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 370 and Zheng Yongnian and Chen Gang “A Political Gold Medal for Xi Jinping: The Successful Beijing Olympics,” EAI Background Brief, No.
407 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, October 8, 2008), p. 1.
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rationale for Xi is that he alone combined the full range of networks.”94
Brown observes that Xi’s “diverse range of supportive networks” spread
from “those he inherited from his father; to those he acquired while
working in his military position; and then in the county, prefecture, provincial and national entities from 1979 onwards.” His eight years in Fujian and Zheijiang Provinces and brief stay in Shanghai linked him to
powerful local business interests and provincial political and social
elites.95 Table 4 confirms that Xi is the only committee member belonging to all the five networks, thus confirming his choice as Hu’s successor.
Table 4: Networks of Members of 18th Politburo Standing Committee
Name
XI Jinping
LI Keqiang
WANG Qishan
ZHANG Gaoli
ZHANG Dejiang
YU Zhengsheng
LIU Yunshan

Networks
Family, military, business, provincial, elite support (5)
Family, provincial, business, some elite support (4)
Family (inherited), provincial (brief), business
(central, intellectual), elite support (4)
Provincial, elite support, business (3)
Provincial, elite support, business (3)
Family, provincial, business, elite support (4)
Business (intellectual, central), some elite support (2)

Source: Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 218.

IV. CHINA’S RELIANCE ON MULTIPLE ANTI-CORRUPTION
AGENCIES
Unlike Singapore and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), which rely on a single ACA like the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC) respectively,96 China relies instead on these four
ACAs: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); the
Ministry of Supervision (MOS); the SPP; and the National Corruption
Prevention Bureau (NCPB).

94. Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2014), p. 218.
95. Ibid., p. 121.
96. For details of these two ACAs, see Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, pp.
221-232, 253-264.
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Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)

The origins of the CCDI, which is the lead ACA in the PRC, can be
traced to the creation of the CCP’s Discipline Supervision Commissions
(DSCs) at the central and provincial levels in April 1927 in order to
strengthen its consistency and authority.97 In November 1949, the CCP’s
Central Political Bureau established the Discipline Inspection Commissions (DICs) at the central and local levels to conduct discipline inspections in all the departments directly under the central government and the
CCP organizations at all levels. Consequently, the number of personnel
in the DICs grew from less than 1,500 to 7,269 from April 1951 to December 1954.98 In 1953, the DICs dealt with 409,532 cases and initiated
disciplinary measures against 74,671 CCP members.99 The DICs were
replaced by the DSCs at the central and local levels in March 1955 to
strengthen the CCP’s political and organizational discipline.100
The Cultural Revolution from May 1966 to October 1976 dismantled the CCP’s discipline inspection system and in April 1969, the DSCs
at all levels were abolished by the CCP’s 9th National Congress, thus
halting the CCP’s discipline inspection work. After more than nine years
in December 1978, the third session of the CCP’s 11th National Congress
decided to re-establish the CCDI, which held its first plenary meeting on
January 4, 1979.101 The CCDI’s 100 members were elected at the December 1978 meeting with CHEN Yun as its first secretary, which enhanced his career prospects in the CCP.102 The 12th Party Congress in
1982 elected a new CCDI with 132 members, of whom only 26 had
served on the previous CCDI.103 The number of CCDI personnel has increased by almost eight times over the past 32 years and reached about
1,000 by December 2014.104

97. Guo Yong, “Historical Evolvement and Future Reform of the China Communist Party
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The CCDI reports to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and is
supervised by the CCP’s Central Committee. The CCDI’s composition
and its procedures are governed by the CCP’s Constitution and statutes,
which entrusts the CCDI with the responsibility of coordinating the
CCP’s anti-corruption activities by article 44.105 The CCDI’s role as the
chief coordinator of the CCP’s anti-corruption efforts and the PRC’s lead
ACA was recognized at the 16th Party Congress in 2002.106 In March
2013, the CCDI’s organizational chart was revealed on the website of the
MOS. The CCDI is divided into these nine offices: General Office; General Inspection Office; Corruption Prevention; Research; Legal Office;
Communication and Education Office; Party Culture Construction Office; Inspection Circuit; and Correction of Unhealthy Tendencies within
Organizations and Industries. These offices are assisted by eight Inspection Offices, which are further divided into these ten units: Law Enforcement Inspection; Performance and Efficiency Management; Investigation Surveillance Office; Prosecutor Office; Letters and Visits Office;
Official Management Office; External Affairs Office; Internal Affairs
Office; Party Commission; and Bureau of Retired Officials.107
The CCDI also publicizes on the same website these five steps for
launching a corruption investigation: (1) receiving the report; (2) preliminary probe; (3) launching the case; (4) investigation; and (5) transfer
case to the police.108 The CCDI has revealed recently that it dispatches
agents to meet fugitive corrupt officials in those countries like the United
States, Canada and Australia, where China does not have extradition
treaties, to persuade them to return home. Furthermore, it also provides
other countries with evidence of criminal activity, including violations of
that country’s immigration laws. China conducted Operation Fox Hunt in
56 countries and by November 2014, 288 fugitives suspected of financial
crimes were arrested by the CCDI.109
Since China’s ACAs employ a sectoral approach to investigate corruption cases, the CCDI and DICs only deal with party officials who are
accused of corruption. Even though the CCDI is China’s lead ACA, it is

105. Irene Hors, Gretta Fenner, Joachim Pohl and Janos Bertok, “Fighting Corruption in
China,” in Governance in China (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005), p. 117.
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Online, March 14, 2013. The MOS website is available at http://www.mos.gov.cn.
108. Ibid.
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fugitives in countries with no extradition treaties,” International Business Times, March 19,
2015.
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not a statutory law supervision agency like the SPP but the CCP’s internal disciplinary agency responsible for investigating corruption involving
party members.110
B.

Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)

The SPP originated from the People’s Procuratorate, which was established in 1949 to ensure that the government’s activities complied
with the law and to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed
by public officials. However, it was the weakest of the four organizational monitors formed by the CCP because of the shortage of cadres and the
fact that its primary function did not entail organizational supervision.111
The People’s Procuratorate “transacted very little actual business” and
played “a minimal role” during its first two years.112 Its “virtually snaillike pace” resulted from “the acute shortage of qualified personnel to
man a comprehensive and balanced network of procuratorial offices.”113
Furthermore, the government did not initiate a training program to meet
the shortage of competent cadres because it preferred to rely on “nonjudicial methods of suppression and punishment, bound by few rules”
than on the People’s Procuratorate, which was hampered by procedural
restrictions. Consequently, the People’s Procuratorate was “fated to occupy a back seat” while other agencies like the Office of Public Security,
“enjoyed undisputed priority of precedence.”114
The SPP was re-established in 1978 to combat judicial corruption.
The People’s Procuratorates are identified by article 129 of the PRC’s
Constitution as the “state organs for legal supervision.” In 1989, the SPP
created the Procuratorial Division of Graft and Bribery in the wake of the
Tiananmen anti-corruption and democracy movement. The Bureau for
Embezzlement and Bribery of the People’s Procuratorate handles and
prevents cases of embezzlement and bribery by investigating economic
crime including misappropriation of public funds, tax evasion and refusal
to pay taxes, and use of fake trademarks.115 The SPP institutionalized its
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111. Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 78-79.
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113. Ibid., 22.
114. Ibid., 23-24.
115. Luo Ji, Miao Chunrui and Guo Hua (Eds.), The Work against Embezzlement and
Bribery in the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Procuratorial Department for Embezzlement and Bribery, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, n.d.), p. 3.
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anti-corruption efforts in 1989 with the formation of the General Bureau
of Anti-Corruption.116
In December 1995, the SPP established an Anti-Corruption and Anti-Bribery General Office and similar offices at the provincial level in 28
provincial procuratorates and at the municipal level in nearly 300 municipal procuratorates. The SPP continued to build specialized anticorruption departments in the local procuratorates to enhance their capacity in corruption control in 1996.117 The SPP renamed its Department
of Law and Regulation as the Department of Anti-Malfeasance of Duty
in July 2000 to reflect these four new priorities: (1) malfeasance of duty
of senior officials in the CCP and administrative sector; (2) judicial sector corruption; (3) administrative legal enforcement corruption; and (4)
public sector employee corruption.118
On November 3, 2014, Xinhua reported that the SPP had formed a
new anti-corruption committee to solve “unprecedentedly serious” cases
of corruption. According to QIU Xueqiang, the Deputy ProcuratorGeneral, since the SPP’s work has been weakened by “a frail organizational structure and staffing limitations,” the new agency “will be better
organized” to help the SPP “handle major cases and break institutional
obstacles.”119
C.

Ministry of Supervision (MOS)

In November 1949, the Central Supervision Commission was created to investigate public accusations against state agencies and officials
for malfeasance and other offenses. Local commissions were also established in the provinces and counties. The Austerity Inspection Commission (AIC) was formed in December 1951 to implement the Three Anti
Campaign. The expansion of the supervision apparatus led to the creation
of 3,586 supervisory agencies with 18,000 supervisory officials and
78,000 “people’s supervision correspondents.”120 The MOS was formed
by the 1954 constitution, which empowered the supervisory agencies to
supervise, investigate and recommend further disciplinary measures

116. Stephen K. Ma, “The Dual Nature of Anti-Corruption Agencies in China,” Crime,
Law and Social Change, 49 (2) (March 2008): 154.
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Chinese University Press, 1997), p. 44.
118. Meng, Corruption in Transitional China, p. 62.
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against administrative misconduct by public officials.121 It was dissolved
in 1959 but was restored by the Standing Committee of the 6th NPC in
December 1986 to curb corruption in the civil service.122
The MOS is described as the “Ministry of Honesty in Foreign Contracts” because it is responsible for checking “all contracts signed with
foreign interests for any indications of ‘corruption’—from failure to provide for compensation within legal limits to undercover arrangements
that amount to bribery.”123 It also investigates the problems encountered
by the different departments of the State Council, the people’s governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in following and enforcing discipline, laws, regulations and decisions of the
people’s government. Its third function is to receive and investigate
complaints about civil servants and personnel of state administrative departments violating administrative procedures. The MOS’s final function
is to accept and consider appeals by those civil servants and other state
administrative personnel for not adhering to the punishment imposed for
their mistakes.124
Both the CCDI and MOS have their counterparts at the provincial,
municipal, and county levels.125 As most civil servants are also party
members, the MOS and CCDI merged in January 1993 after working together for six years. However, both ACAs have retained their separate
organizational identities, with the MOS being responsible for the control
of administrative punishment in State Council organs and the CCDI focusing instead on the punishment of CCP members.126
D.

National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB)

Unlike the CCDI, SPP and MOS, which focus on the investigation
and prosecution of corruption offenses among public officials, the NCPB
was formed on September 13, 2007 as China’s fourth ACA to implement
preventive measures, monitor the transfer of assets across the organizations, facilitate and promote information sharing between agencies, and
police corrupt practices among private enterprises, social organizations,
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124. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
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and nongovernmental organizations.127 Thus, the NCPB focuses on two
aspects not dealt with by the other three ACAs namely, corruption prevention and private sector corruption.
The NCPB is located within the MOS and was headed by MA Wen,
who was the Minister of Supervision, the CCDI deputy secretary and a
Central Committee party member. It is divided into four offices with a
coordinating office, and consists of 30 personnel drawn from the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme People’s Court and the SPP.128 The CCDI,
MOS and SPP are ineffective ACAs because of “limited coordination between the three agencies, a lack of timely, actionable information, and
narrow oversight capabilities all hinder anti-corruption work.”129 Consequently, the NCPB cannot enhance coordination and facilitate cooperation among the ACAs in China because apart from its limited independence and minimal enforcement capabilities, its creation has increased
complexity instead of improving coordination. The NCPB is in “a highly
untenable position” because it lacks the power to enforce its mandate of
coordinating the work of the ACAs.130 Its creation was “symbolic” as it
cannot investigate individual cases of corruption.131
E.

Weaknesses of China’s ACAs

There is an unequal division of labor and power among the four
ACAs in China with the lead ACA, the CCDI, being the most powerful
and responsible for dealing with party officials accused of corruption offenses. Those found guilty of disciplinary offenses, including corruption,
are punished according to the severity of their offenses. Punishments can
include a warning, serious warning, demotion from duty, expulsion from
the CCP with a two-year probation period, or expulsion from the CCP
and transfer to the judicial system for those accused of accepting bribes
exceeding 5,000 yuan.132
Flora Sapio has criticized the CCDI for protecting party cadres who
are under investigation by shielding them in “a safe nest” and exempting
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them from criminal punishment.133 This weakness of the CCDI is reflected in the low conviction rate of party members being investigated
for misconduct. PEI Minxin found that only 1,915 (6.6 percent) of the
28,901 cadres disciplined by the CCDI were sentenced by the courts.134
The CCP’s lenient treatment of its corrupt members can be attributed to
the political tradition of not imposing the legal penalty for corrupt party
members in order to save the “face” of the CCP and government and
prevent the erosion of official authority. In other words, instead of punishing high-ranking officials, which is shameful and threatens the authority of the CCP and government, the preferred option is to rely on “internal resolution.” Consequently, corrupt party officials believe that they
would unlikely be caught or punished.135
Since not all officials who are suspected of corruption and investigated in China are convicted, CAI Yongshun contends that some corrupt
officials are punished less severely for three reasons. First, those corrupt
officials who are cooperative, make voluntary confessions, provide information on the corruption of other officials, and return illegal income
to the government, are punished less severely. Second, some corrupt officials receive less harsh punishment depending on the definition of the
amount of money embezzled or bribes received. Third, when there are
many corrupt officials, only seriously corrupt officials are punished
whereas the less corrupt officials are exempted from punishment in order
to avoid paralyzing the operations of the city or local government. Indeed, “when the number of corrupt agents becomes too high, curbing
corruption becomes too difficult, if not impossible.” 136 The inconsistencies in investigating and punishing corrupt officials at both the central
and local levels in China have undermined the credibility of the disciplinary agencies and encouraged the belief among officials that they would
unlikely be punished for corrupt offenses.137
The CCP’s preference for disciplining corrupt party members by relying on the DICs instead of subjecting them to investigation and prosecution by the SPP has also contributed to their low conviction rate. Apart
from replacing harsh criminal punishment with disciplinary action for
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corrupt officials, the probability of establishing their guilt is very low due
to the limited investigative skills and experience of the DIC personnel
and the fact that it takes them nine months to complete their investigations.138 Corrupt officials can cover their tracks and destroy incriminating evidence to avoid punishment because of the DIC personnel’s poor
investigative skills and inordinate delay in completing their investigations.139 In comparison to the DIC, the SPP has more personnel with a
legal education background and are also more professional.140
During their formative years, the CCDI and DICs were inadequately
staffed and their personnel’s lack of previous experience in control work
was not supplemented by specialized training because of the emphasis on
their moral qualities and adherence to party principles.141 Instead of addressing their personnel’s lack of skills in discipline inspection work, the
DICs provided ideological and vocational training to enhance their understanding of party policies and increase their knowledge in several related fields.142
In additional to the limited capacity of the CCDI and DICs personnel, China’s ACAs are also not independent. The CCDI members are
elected for five years by the CCP’s Central Committee. The MOS is a
functional department of the State Council and its minister is nominated
by the Premier and approved by the NPC or its standing committee. The
budgets of the CCDI and MOS are also approved by the People’s congresses at the same level.143 The personnel of the CCDI and DICs have
faced “numerous difficulties” because of their limited operational autonomy from the CCP. The 1955 National Conference highlighted the DICs’
lack of autonomy but the 1956 Party Constitution reaffirmed their subordination to the party committees.144 The DIC personnel are subject to the
dual authority or leadership of the party committee at the corresponding
hierarchical level, and higher-level control organs up to the CCDI and
the Central Committee.145 In investigating those party members who
138. Manion, Corruption by Design, pp. 132-134.
139. Ibid., p. 135 and Hors, Fenner, Pohl and Bertok, “Fighting Corruption in China,” p.
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have violated party style, the DICs distinguish between “work mistakes,
political mistakes, line mistakes, and counter-revolutionary actions” and
rely on educating them on discipline and party style instead of punishing
them.146
The SPP’s independence is compromised in practice by the power
of the local party committee and local people’s government regarding the
appointment, promotion, transfer or removal of procuratorial personnel
and the funding of the procuratorates. A provincial procuratorate is equal
in status and independent of the provincial people’s government according to the Constitution, but in practice it is viewed as a subordinate part
of the people’s government. The procuratorates are ineffective in supervising the legality of the work of the public security agencies and labor
reform organizations as they cannot enforce their recommendations for
rectifying the irregularities or impose sanctions for these irregularities.
Finally, as most procurators are not well trained, a Central Procurators
Management Academy was established in 1991 to enhance their training.147
The final limitation is the lack of coordination between the CCDI
and the SPP. Since the MOS merged with the CCDI in 1993, there is limited coordination and cooperation between both agencies because of their
unequal relationship. The CCDI and DICs have four advantages over the
SPP in investigating corruption cases. The first advantage arises from the
fact that since the DICs learn about the corruption cases first, they can
investigate these cases before transferring them to the procuratorates.
Second, the CCDI can appropriate criminal corruption cases involving
party members by punishing them internally with disciplinary measures
instead of transferring them to the SPP for prosecution and harsher punishment. The DICs’ third advantage is their broader jurisdiction, which
enables them to investigate a broader range of misconduct than the procuratorates. The final advantage arises from the larger number of DICs
and their omnipresence at the grassroots level, in rural villages, urban
neighborhoods, and within workplaces. As the procuratorates only operate at the county level, it is not surprising that the CCDI and DICs have
received more reports of corruption than the procuratorates.148
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To minimize competition and enhance cooperation between the
CCDI and SPP, both agencies agreed in 1988 to share information and
transfer cases. In 1989, the CCDI, SPP, Supreme People’s Court and the
Ministry of Public Security also agreed to share information and documents in the investigation of corruption cases. Furthermore, in 1993, the
CCDI, SPP and MOS issued the “Circular to Strengthen Cooperation between the DICs and Procuratorates in Anti-Corruption” to promote cooperation by agreeing to meet regularly.149 However, in practice, given its
status as the lead ACA and the CCP’s preference for disciplining corrupt
party members internally, the CCDI and DICs investigate more corruption complaints involving party members than the SPP and the procuratorates.
V. XI JINPING’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
A.

Mass Campaigns in China

In his analysis of various anti-corruption measures, Leslie Holmes
has identified anti-corruption campaigns as a popular measure for curbing corruption in communist and post-communist states, including Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Russia and Ukraine (which
had initiated anti-corruption campaigns during the 1990s).150 China has
implemented the most anti-corruption campaigns151 and even though the
former Soviet Union initiated many anti-corruption campaigns in the
1980s, it “could not match the Chinese in terms of public campaigning
by the leadership against corruption.”152
The extensive reliance on mass campaigns in China is also reflected
in the literature. 153 Alan Liu has defined a “mass campaign” as “a series
149. Guo, “Historical Evolvement and Future Reform of the China Communist Party Discipline Inspection Commission,” p. 248.
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(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 238.
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MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966); Frederic
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Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (Eds.), Communications and Change in the Developing Countries (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), pp. 195-215; Alan P.L. Liu, Communications
and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1971); Frederick C. Teiwes, Rectification Campaigns and Purges in Communist China, 195061 (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971); Gordon Bennett, Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership (Berkeley, CA: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1976); Charles P. Cell, Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in
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of organized, planned actions for a particular purpose, usually involving
the mobilization of a large number of people to engage in highly visible,
intensive, and concentrated activities.”154 Unlike Liu, Charles Cell defines a mass mobilization campaign as an “organized mobilization of collective action aimed at transforming thought patterns, class/power relationships and/or economic institutions and productivity.”155 Finally,
Gordon Bennett defines a Chinese yundong or campaign as “a government-sponsored effort to storm and eventually overwhelm strong but
vulnerable barriers to the progress of socialism through intensive mass
mobilization of active personal commitment.”156
After analyzing the various mass campaigns conducted in China
from 1949-1966, Liu has identified four types of campaigns: (1) functionally diffuse and with a target group; (2) functionally diffuse and
without a target group; (3) functionally specific and with a target group;
and (4) functionally specific and without a target group.157 Similarly, Cell
has provided a threefold classification of campaigns based on his definition: (1) economic campaigns to improve economic conditions and are
directed at the agricultural, industrial, commercial, and medical sectors;
(2) ideological campaigns, which are concerned with “changing thinking,
and cultural and educational standards, correcting erroneous
thoughts . . ., raising each person’s general political consciousness, and
opposing anti-socialist forces outside the society”; and (3) struggle campaigns, which attempt to correct erroneous thinking and eliminate the
power base and/or class position of enemy classes or groups.158
The origins of China’s use of mass campaigns can be traced to
MAO Zedong’s reliance on “the mass line” to perceive the principal
“contradictions” in society and to initiate and implement campaigns to
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resolve these “contradictions.”159 The mass mobilization campaign was
the “central strategy utilizing the mass line”160 as mass line techniques
were “embodied primarily in waves of mass campaigns.”161 There were
four stages in a campaign. During the first phase of policy formulation,
Mao or one of his supporters would suggest the launching of a campaign
to tackle a “contradiction” or problem. The public announcement of the
campaign was followed by the dissemination of relevant information by
means of mobilization meetings, study groups, articles, and press editorials discussing the campaign. The third stage entailed mass participation
by the targeted sectors of the population where there would be mass rallies, self-criticism meetings, and visits to the countryside. The end of the
campaign was followed by an evaluation, which would discuss whether
the campaign was effective in resolving the contradiction or whether new
problems had emerged after the campaign.162
B.

The Three Anti and Five Anti Campaigns (1951-1952)

After the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, the CCP initiated its first large-scale anti-corruption campaign two years later because China was still “haunted” by corruption.163 The CCP lacked competent administrative personnel to attain its goal of transforming China
because its cadre corps consisted of three groups: old cadres, new cadres
and fresh university graduates, and many retained KMT personnel, intellectuals and specialists. Both the old and new cadres were vulnerable to
corruption for different reasons and the CCP was concerned that the retained KMT personnel would continue with their previous corrupt practices.164
The Three Anti (Sanfan) Campaign, which was launched by the
CCP on August 31, 1951, was a functionally specific urban campaign directed at its members to reduce corruption, waste and bureaucracy.165 It
was an ideological campaign “against the corrupt and degenerate ideolo-
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gy of the bourgeoisie,”166 which ended in May 1952 and involved “the
all-out mobilization of both party cadres and the general public.” The
Austerity Inspection Commissions (AICs) were established at each
level to coordinate the anti-corruption activities of the CCP’s DICs, the
administrative supervision commissions, the procurate, and the courts.167
Mao was personally involved in the Sanfan Campaign because he
was responsible for setting its “course, guiding principles, and policies”
and issuing important instructions during November and December
1951.168 He also read and commented on major reports and telegrams
from various provinces and ministries on their anti-corruption activities.
He had sent telegrams to provincial leaders to urge them to catch those
“big tigers,” that is, those who had embezzled a large amount of money
and materials. Mao had also approved the execution of two senior officials, LIU Qingshan and ZHANG Zishan, who were found guilty of graft
and embezzlement.169
There were four phases in the Three Anti Campaign: (1) the inspection phase organized by the AICs for mutual inspections between superior and subordinate officers; (2) the confession phase where those cadres
who had committed embezzlement and graft were pressured to make
confessions and self-criticism instead of concealing their misconduct; (3)
the denunciation phase where the masses and lower-level officials and
staff were mobilized to “confront their corrupt superiors and expose
wrongdoing, which they would otherwise not have dared to do”; and (4)
the investigation or “tiger-hunting” phase of catching those suspected
cadres who had not confessed earlier for their wrongdoing. Each unit was
given a quota of “tigers” to hunt.170 The Sanfan Campaign conducted
“struggle meetings” throughout China to attack offending cadres and remove them from office by mass demand.171 During the campaign period,
there was “a spectacle of astonishing disclosures of serious corruption
and waste in government, of accusations against government officials of
all ranks (excepting the top leadership of the Communist Party), and of
confessions made ‘voluntarily’ or under various degrees of pressure.”172
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Table 5: Participants of Three Anti Campaign and “Tigers” Caught
by Region, 1951-52
Region

Total Participants

Central Agencies
North China
Northeast China
Northwest China
Eastern China
South Central China
Southwest China
Inner Mongolia
Total

88,427 (2.3%)
890,231 (23.1%)
755,271 (19.6%)
289,647 (7.5%)
797,272 (20.7%)
496,716 (12.9%)
492,419 (12.8%)
40,530 (1.1%)
3,850,513 (100%)

“Tigers” (those embezzling
> 1,000 yuan) caught
822 (0.9%)
16,107 (1.8%)
18,569 (2.5%)
2,478 (0.9%)
15,411 (1.9%)
13,843 (2.8%)
28,810 (5.9%)
1,790 (4.4%)
107,830 (2.8%)

Source: Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 56, Table 2.1.

HO Kan-chih, the CCP’s official historian, estimated that 4.5 percent of all state officials in China were punished during the Three Anti
Campaign.173 Table 5 shows that, in terms of participation, the campaign
was most effective in North China (23.1 percent), followed by Eastern
China (20.7 percent) and Northeast China (19.6 percent), and the least
effective in Inner Mongolia (1.1 percent). However, Southwest China
was most effective in catching “tigers” (those who had embezzled more
than 1,000 yuan) (5.9 percent), followed by Inner Mongolia (4.4 percent). Table 5 also shows that among the 3.85 million cadres in government agencies above the county level who participated in the campaign,
107,830 “tigers” (2.8 percent) were caught. However, 10,009 “tigers”
(9.3 percent) were sentenced to imprisonment and only 42 “tigers” (0.04
percent) were executed. The number of “tigers” punished was fewer than
Mao had expected because many cadres who were initially accused of
graft were subsequently spared from any disciplinary action.174
In sum, the Sanfan Campaign was effective in mass mobilization
against corruption in the short term. It demonstrated the CCP’s commitment to curb corruption among its members and enhance its legitimacy
among the urban population.175 However, it had unintended consequences such as backlash and personal vengeance in the long run. The director
of the CCP’s Central Organization Department admitted that a mass
campaign was ineffective in changing the behavior of the participants
because “no sooner is the campaign over than they would return to their

173. Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in China, p. 318.
174. Lu, Cadres and Corruption, p. 56.
175. Ibid., p. 59.
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old selves.”176 Another serious problem was that those officials who
were criticized or denounced by their subordinates retaliated against the
latter by “fixing them” (zheng ren) or “giving them tight shoes to wear”
(chuan xiaoxie).177
The Wufan Campaign was implemented throughout urban China
during the first half of 1952 and was directed against businessmen and
industrialists who were alleged to be guilty of spreading the “five poisons”: “bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information.”178 After the
PRC’s establishment in October 1949, many CCP members including
veterans became complacent and enriched themselves by accepting
bribes, using public funds for private business ventures, and selling public property to private individuals.179 The number of tax evasion cases by
capitalists increased from 49,175 in 1949 to 139,068 by November
1951.180 Apart from evading taxes, many capitalists also stole state assets, cheated on government contracts, and stole state economic data.
The CCP was also concerned that many private entrepreneurs were “pulling out” old and new cadres by buying them “banquets, gifts, sales commissions, and beautiful girls.”181
Corruption was a serious problem in Shanghai and other cities in
China where the CCP members were working closely with “bourgeois
elements.” Following the Sanfan Campaign, which purged the “corrupt
elements” within the CCP, the bureaucracy, and state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), the Wufan Campaign attacked the bourgeoisie for spreading the
“five poisons” and for being the source of the anti-social and decadent
attitudes of urban China.182 On December 27, 1951, the CCP established
the Shanghai Increase Production and Practice Economy Committee to
control the processes of propaganda and inspection and to handle cases.183 This Committee instructed the branch committee members to attack the corrupt practices in every business by conducting “selfexamination” and organizing mutual inspections.184
Following the Sanfan Campaign, “accusations, public trials, confessions, huge mass meetings and the like [also] marked” the Wufan Cam176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 54.
Gardner, “The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai,” p. 478.
Ibid., p. 493.
Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China, p. 64.
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Ibid., p. 502.
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paign.185 Public support for the Wufan Campaign was initiated by encouraging citizens to participate in “denunciation meetings, presenting
specific accusations against individuals in public trials, serving on investigation teams, [and] offering information on ‘unconfessed’ or undiscovered offenders.”186 The Wufan Campaign surpassed its predecessor in
scale because it investigated more than 450,000 business firms in the
nine largest cities in China. Since hoarding was endemic in China, the
Wufan Campaign “pried loose much frozen wealth” and relied on “terroristic methods” to provide “new recruits for the concentration camps in
the interior.” These purges struck fear in the hearts of the officials, but
did not consolidate the state apparatus.187
The Five Anti Campaign was also significant because “it enabled
the leadership to consolidate its power in urban China by extending its
influence over both the bourgeoisie and the working class.”188 Apart
from changing old attitudes and habits, the campaign also enabled the
CCP to curb the problem of bourgeois corruption and “curtail severely
the independence of the industrial and commercial groups after 1952.”189
However, “the supreme irony” was that even though the campaign succeeded in eliminating bourgeois corruption, the CCP could not eliminate
corruption among its own members.190 Furthermore, the campaign had
mixed results because it succeeded in curbing bribery and tax evasion,
but at the expense of slowing down the economy and increasing unemployment due to the closure of many business firms. The economic recession resulted in massive unemployment and economic hardship
among the urban population.191
Chen and Chen have indicated that both campaigns provided the
state with US$1,250 million from the fines collected from offenders, delinquent tax assessments, and “returned stolen assets” including confiscated property in order to meet the high costs of the Korean war.192 Both
campaigns had also enhanced the power of the state over both private
business and the mobilization of the population as a whole.193 However,
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their implementation not only exposed the extent of corruption in the
government and CCP, but the Sanfan Campaign also showed that many
cadres at the village level could not be trusted to enforce agrarian reform
projects properly without “deviations” and adopting a correct “working
style.”194
Perhaps, the most serious weakness of the CCP’s reliance on “mass
mobilization” campaigns is the inherent difficulty of sustaining emotions
“at a high pitch” because “public interest shifts and emotions subside”
when the appeal or novelty wears off. The implementation of both campaigns shows that “despite the attendant fanfare and elaborate trappings,
public interest lagged after the first weeks.” Some people complained
that they were so exhausted by the Sanfan Campaign that they could not
participate in both the Wufan Campaign and the spring sowing.195
C.

Major Features of Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign

The major difference between the Maoist campaigns and its postMao variant was that the former involved “high degrees of mass mobilization” while the latter lacked the “mass mobilizational element” and
were launched by “the leadership to focus the state bureaucracy on enforcement of previously existing rules and laws.”196 The anti-corruption
campaigns in China during the 1980s and 1990s were anti-corruption
struggles (fan fubai douzheng) characterized by these two features: enhanced publicity to encourage the public to report corruption and corrupt
officials to confess their misconduct and the demand by the political
leaders to increase the enforcement of the anti-corruption measures. The
second feature reflects the leaders’ reliance on “enforcement figures as
political performance targets” because they “view increased cases as evidence of greater anti-corruption commitment, not more corruption.” In
other words, “more cases connote enforcement success, not deterrence
failure.”197 The CCP has launched anti-corruption campaigns to “reclaim
ruling legitimacy and re-establish itself as the moral agent at a time when
its apparatuses are infested with corruption.”198
Like the functionally specific Three Anti and Five Anti Campaigns
of 1951-1952, which were directed toward senior government officials

194. Ibid., 19-20.
195. Ibid., 22-23.
196. Strauss, “Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC,” p.
42.
197. Manion, Corruption by Design, p. 161.
198. Ruoyun Bai, Staging Corruption: Chinese Television and Politics (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 2015), p. 157.
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and businessmen, XI Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is wider in
scope since it targets both senior and junior officials i.e., the “tigers” and
the “flies.” At the same time, Xi’s campaign is also an ideological and
struggle campaign because it is directed at changing the corrupt behavior
of senior and junior officials as well as eroding the power base and/or
class position of enemy classes or groups.
Yundong or mass campaigns in China perform these seven functions: (1) implementing an existing policy; (2) emulating advanced experience; (3) introducing and popularizing a new policy; (4) correcting deviations from important public norms; (5) rectifying leadership
malpractices among responsible cadres or organizations; (6) purging
from office individuals whose political opposition is excessive; and (7)
effecting “enduring changes in both individual attitudes and social institutions which will contribute to the growth of a collective spirit and support the construction of socialism.”199 Following Bennett’s list of seven
functions, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign focuses on the fourth, fifth and
sixth functions by minimizing corrupt practices among senior and junior
officials.
The first feature of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is its durability.
Unlike previous campaigns, it has lasted for more than two years and is
unlikely to end soon. On August 25, 2014, WANG Qishan, the CCDI
secretary, indicated that the anti-corruption campaign would last for another five years and reminded officials to avoid the mid-autumn tradition
of providing mooncakes as gifts.200 On March 2, 2015, LIU Xinhua, the
spokesman for the third session of the 12th National Committee of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, confirmed that China’s current anti-corruption campaign “has no limit or ceiling” and that
“no one has impunity.”201 The same message was reiterated one day later by Premier LI Keqiang, who declared that “our tough stance on corruption is here to stay; our tolerance for corruption is zero, and anyone
found guilty of corruption will be dealt with seriously.”202 Xi’s anticorruption campaign is a “game-changer” because it is “on-going and ex-

199. Bennett, Yundong, p. 46.
200. “China’s war on graft set to last 5 more years,” Straits Times, September 6, 2014, p.
A18.
201. “China’s anti-graft drive has ‘no limit or ceiling’,” Straits Times, March 3, 2015, p.
A20.
202. Megha Rajagopalan, “China premier vows to fight pollution, corruption,” Reuters,
March 4, 2015.
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tensive, and implemented in tandem with [a] crackdown on official extravagance and overspending on banquets, gifts and overseas trips.”203
Second, Xi’s campaign is “the most sustained and intensive drive
against corruption” since 1978 because it is a war waged on these four
fronts: (1) a guerrilla war at the grassroots level where whistle-blowers
and netizens employ social media to expose low-level corrupt officials;
(2) trench warfare against corrupt officials below the county and department levels; (3) corruption in the business sector or “commercial bribery”; and (4) corruption as a weapon in factional infighting among the
CCP leaders.204 BO Xilai’s fall from power meant that he was no longer
Xi’s political rival and the investigations of ZHOU Yongkang and his
protégés for corruption enabled Xi to further consolidate his power.205
Third, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign also focuses on curbing Chinese officials’ extravagance on public expenses such as vehicles, banquets and overseas trips or sangong xiaofei, which had generated a great
deal of public criticism.206 CHEN Gang traces such extravagance to the
granting to magistrates in imperial China of political privileges and generous fringe benefits in addition to their modest salaries. The political
status of these magistrates was linked to the extent of extravagance
shown to them in official receptions, banquets and travelling. An official’s status and rank was also reflected in the quality of his official sedan chair (guanjiao) and the number of followers and sedan chair bearers. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) the number of sedan chair
carriers ranged from two for a courtling, to eight for a minister or governor, to the maximum of 64 bearers for the emperor.207
Not surprisingly, official cars in contemporary China are also
ranked according to their engine capacity and cost. A 2004 regulation
specifies that a minister is entitled to an official car with a 3-litre engine
capacity that costs 450,000 yuan (US$71,000). A vice-minister is entitled
to a 3-litre capacity car worth 350,000 yuan (US$55,293) and an official
below the vice-ministerial rank is allocated a 2-litre capacity official car

203. Chen Gang, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” EAI Background Brief, No. 933 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 30
June 2014), p. 6.
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costing 250,000 yuan (US$39,494). However, in practice, this regulation
has not been enforced strictly at the local or provincial levels.208
The banquet is an important aspect of Chinese culture and its primary purpose is “to create and maintain social harmony.”209 Since “eating is
symbolic of showing good faith — ‘giving each other face’” – the Chinese prefer to establish informal relationships first with potential business partners by having a meal together to get to know each other in a
casual setting to enable both parties to establish guanxi. The belief is that
when two parties can sit down to eat a meal harmoniously they can trust
each other in business.210 The Chinese officials’ penchant for “alcohol
banquets” or jiu xi is related to China’s culture of wining and dining at
lavish banquets to facilitate networking in politics and business. In China
and many Asian countries, drinking alcoholic beverages is associated
with fostering “new personal, political, and business relationships, and in
celebrating business and political events.”211
The lavishness of a banquet is linked to the respect accorded by the
host for his guests and “the amount of alcohol consumed by either side”
is “an indication of the level of political trust and friendship.”212 Alcohol
was “such a reliable choice [as a bribe] that the state media conceded that
sales of the country’s most famous liquor, Kweichow Moutai, was ‘an
index for China’s corruption.’”213 Its price increased from 200 yuan per
bottle in 2005 to 2,000 yuan per bottle in 2012 because of the demand
generated by its widespread use at official dinners.214 Consequently, reciprocating Chinese drinking and dining hospitality can be expensive
since the cost depends on the pomp of the banquet and the restaurant’s
head rate (biao zhem) increases with the rank of the banquet guests.215
The problem of “illegitimate feasting” is not new since Liu found
that it was the second most common type of corruption among the 304
media reports of corruption in China from 1977 to 1980. The illegitimate
feasting and cadres’ lavish, traditional style weddings and funerals adversely affect the CCP member’s dongfen or style of work and under-
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mine the communist ideal that he ought to be “a revolutionary ascetic.”216
Contrary to Mao’s observation that “revolution is not a dinner party,” LI
Cheng contends that “for the rich and corrupt officials, the reform has
literally been a ‘dinner party’” as a 1992 survey revealed that US$18 billion of public funds were spent on dinner banquets.217
Since the Chinese officials’ extravagance on the three public expenses can be traced to the tradition in Imperial China of relying on the
lavishness of official sedan chairs and banquets to differentiate the ranking of officials, it will be difficult for the central government to curb such
extravagance across the country without “detailed regulations and strict
enforcement.”218 Consequently, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign should be
viewed as an attempt to rectify the shortcoming of previous efforts to
curb official extravagance on the three public expenses.
Accordingly, the CCP Politburo meeting chaired by XI Jinping on
December 4, 2012 passed the following “Eight Directives” or baxiang
guiding:
1. Do investigations and research, guard against going through
the motions and practicing formalism, travel light with a only a
small entourage, reduce accompanying staff, and simplify receptions with people;
2. Simplify meeting activities, enhance the effectiveness of meetings, shorten meetings and speeches, and ban empty talk and
verbiage;
3. Simplify documents and bulletins, stop routinely issuing documents and reports that have no real content and that need not
be issued;
4. Standardize official visits abroad, strictly control the numbers
of accompanying personnel, and strictly use communications
tools according to regulations;
5. Improve security work, reduce traffic controls, and under general conditions not block traffic, clear areas or close off hotels
or restaurants;
6. Improve news reporting, decide questions of whether or not to
report Politburo members presiding over meetings and other
activities according to the needs of work, news value, and so216. Alan P.L. Liu, “The Politics of Corruption in the People’s Republic of China,” in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston and Victor T. LeVine (Eds.), Political Corruption: A
Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), p. 491.
217. Cheng Li, “Revolution is no dinner party, but China’s reform is,” CNN.com, 1999,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/red.giant/communism (accessed
24 February 2015).
218. Chen, “China Curbs Official Extravagance,” p. 12.
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cial effects, and progressively reduce the volume, number and
length of reports;
7. Regulate issuance of draft documents and, except under uniform central provisions, stop publishing their own works or
speech collections in open media, and stop issuing congratulatory letters or telegrams or writing inscriptions; and
8. Strictly enforce working hard and practicing economy, and
strictly carry out relevant work and livelihood remuneration
regulations with regard to allocation of housing, cars, etc.219
Xi himself followed these “Eight Directives” during his first official
tour of Shenzhen, Zuhai and Guangzhou in Guangdong Province after
the meeting by travelling in a small minibus instead of a limousine and
dispensing with lavish receptions and ceremonies.220 However, it appears that the sixth directive of maintaining a low public profile does not
apply to him because according to an observer, “he draws the press untiring attention and enjoys high-profile publicity on the media notwithstanding the CCP Central Committee’s Eight Rules discouraging ‘nonessential’ detail coverage or long reports of the top leaders’ daily
activities.”221 Furthermore, contrary to the seventh directive of not publishing books or speech collections, Xi published in 2014 The Governance of China, which is a compilation of the 79 speeches he made from
November 12, 2012 to June 13, 2014.222 On January 11, 2015,
Xinhuanet.com announced the publication of another book compiling
Xi’s 216 remarks on anti-corruption drawn from his 40 speeches, articles
and written instructions from November 15, 2012 to October 23, 2014.223
The “Eight Directives” were implemented by 17 provinces and municipalities from January 2013 in order to streamline the bureaucracy and
curb waste and extravagance.224 Since VIP cards for private clubs became popular after the implementation of the “Eight Directives” all anticorruption officials in China were ordered in late May by WANG
Qishan, the CCDI’s Secretary, to surrender their private club VIP cards

219. This is the English translation of the “Eight Directives” provided in Alice Miller,
“The Road to the Third Plenum,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 42 (October 7, 2013): 2-3.
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China Morning Post, January 4, 2013.

46

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

before June 20, 2013 because these cards can be used to pay for the services provided at these clubs.225 Also since access to vehicles is a perk
given to senior CCP members and government officials, the new regulations issued on May 1, 2013 banned the owners of luxury foreign cars
like BMW and Bentley from applying for military and armed police license plates because these plates enabled their owners “to skirt traffic
laws with impunity and skip toll fees.”226 In November 2013, the State
Council banned provincial level officials from using official cars for
general use. On January 14, 2014, the State Council disallowed military
officers from purchasing foreign made vehicles.227
In order to curb extravagance on galas and official dinners, a regulation banning all government agencies from using public funds to organize galas was issued by the State Council on November 25, 2013. This
was followed by another regulation in December 2013 which removed
shark’s fin soup, bird’s nest soup and wild animal products from the
menu and prohibited the provision of free cigarettes and expensive liquor
at official dinners.228 During the same month, the CCP’s General Office
and the State Council’s General Office issued these “Six Injunctions” or
liuxiang jinling:
1. Officials are prohibited from using public funds to pay for visits, gifts, receptions and banquets during the New Year celebrations.
2. Officials are prohibited from giving complimentary local
products to their superiors.
3. Officials are banned from accepting gifts, cash, gift vouchers
or prepaid cards.
4. Officials are not allowed to take part in high-end recreational
activities or to use official receptions to host families or friends
during the holidays. Officials are banned from using public
vehicles for private matters.
5. All receptions should strictly follow the guidelines of the central and provincial governments.

225. Choi Chi-yuk, “Surrender your private club VIP cards, China’s anti-graft officials are
told,” South China Morning Post, May 28, 2013.
226. William Wan, “China curbs use of coveted military license plates in latest anticorruption move,” Washington Post, April 1, 2013.
227. Tim Donovan, “China’s Crackdown on Corruption and Government Spending: A
Timeline,” China Business Review, January 23, 2014.
228. Ibid., and J.T. Quigley, “No more Shark’s Fin Soup and Bird’s Nest Soup at CCP
Banquets,” The Diplomat, December 9, 2013.
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6. All officials are banned from organizing or participating in
gambling activities.229
The fourth feature of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is its reliance on inspection teams (xunshizu), which are dispatched across China to investigate corruption in corruption-prone provinces, ministries, state corporations and public service organizations. These inspection teams scrutinize
the work of the cadres, government officials, legislators and political advisers.230 This practice is inspired by the sending of imperial envoys
(qinchai dachen) by the emperor to oversee officials in the provinces in
the past. The CCDI sent the first batch of 10 inspection teams during
May to July 2013 to various locations with each team being stationed for
two months to provide feedback on corruption to the CCDI. The second
batch of 10 inspection teams was dispatched to other locations from October to December 2013.231 Table 6 provides details of these 20 inspection teams and their locations.
Table 6: CCDI’s Inspection Teams, May to December 2013
Serial No. of
Inspection Team

Location of Inspection
(First batch, May-July)

No. 1

China Grain Reserves
Corporation
Hubei Province
Ministry of Water Resources
Inner Mongolia
Chongqing City
Guizhou Province
China Publishing Group
Corporation
Jiangxi Province
Export-Import Bank of China
Renmin University of China

No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
No. 5
No. 6
No. 7
No. 8
No. 9
No. 10

Location of Inspection
(Second batch, OctoberDecember)
Ministry of Commerce
Xinhua News Agency
Ministry of Land and Resources
Jilin Province
Yunnan Province
Shanxi Province
Anhui Province
Guangdong Province
Three Gorges Corporation
Hunan Province

Source: Xinhua News Agency quoted in Chen Gang, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s AntiCorruption Campaign,” EAI Background Brief, No. 933 (Singapore: East Asian Institute,
National University of Singapore, June 30, 2014), p. 9, Table 2.

The CCDI’s reliance on these inspection teams has reaped dividends since their inception. In 2013, these teams have investigated
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182,000 officials, which is 13 percent more than in 2012.232 The inspection teams discovered widespread corruption in the provinces of Shanxi,
Hunan, Guizhou and Jiangxi, and in the China Grain Reserves Corporation, Renmin University and the Three Gorges Corporation.233 The CCDI
inspection team based in Hunan Province exposed an electoral fraud
scandal, which forced more than 500 municipal lawmakers to resign, and
dismissed 56 representatives of the Hunan People’s Congress for being
elected through bribery.234 The investigations of “big tigers” or highlevel corrupt officials targeted in Xi’s anti-graft campaign have revealed
many cases where “tiger wives” played an important role in their husbands’ corruption. Not surprisingly, the CCDI inspection teams have
found family corruption in regions where the officials’ spouses and families have taken advantage of their husbands’ or fathers’ power to reap
personal benefits.235
Consequently, the CCDI sent two batches of 13 inspection teams
from March to September 2014 to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 13 provinces, three autonomous regions, three corporations, two ministries and
two academic institutions. Table 7 provides details of these 26 inspection
teams and their locations.
Table 7: CCDI Inspection Teams, March to September 2014
Serial No. of
Inspection Team
No. 1
No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
No. 5
No. 6

No. 7
No. 8
No. 9
No. 10

Location of Inspections
(First batch, March-May)
Gansu Province
Beijing
Ningxia Autonomous Region
Shandong Province
Tianjin
Xinjiang & Xinjiang
Production & Construction
Corporation
Hainan Province
Henan Province
Fujian Province
Ministry of Science and
Technology

Location of Inspections
(First batch, July-September)
Guangxi Autonomous Region
Shanghai
Qinghai Province
Tibet Autonomous Region
Zheijiang Province
Hebei Province

Shaanxi Province
Heilongjiang Province
Sichuan Province
Chinese Academy of Sciences

232. Donovan, “China’s Crackdown on Corruption and Government Spending.”
233. Chen, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” p. 8.
234. Ibid., p. 9 and “China: More than 500 resign over election fraud,” BBC News China,
December 28, 2013.
235. “Inside the lives of the ‘tiger wives’: Anti-graft campaign brings to light misdeeds of
corrupt officials’ spouses,” Global Times, March 30, 2015. See also, Minnie Chan, “‘Tiger
Wife’ who wooed doomed major general,” South China Morning Post, March 22, 2015.
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No. 12
No. 13

Liaoning Province
Fudan University
China National Cereals, Oil &
Foodstuffs Corporation
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General Administration of Sport
Jiangsu Province
FAW Group

Source: Xinhua News Agency quoted in Chen Gang, “Wang Qishan and China’s Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection,” EAI Background Brief, No. 1012 (Singapore:
East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, April 2, 2015), pp. 16-17, Table 5.

The CCDI traps a corrupt official by arranging a high-profile meeting which requires his attendance. The CCDI investigators then wait outside the meeting room and monitor the meeting by using surveillance
cameras and receiving text messages from someone attending the meeting. At an appropriate moment, the CCDI investigators would enter the
meeting room to arrest the targeted official in the presence of the other
senior officials attending the meeting to intimidate and warn them of the
consequences of being corrupt. The tactics employed by the CCDI investigators to trap and arrest WAN Qingliang, the Party Secretary in Guangzhou, on June 27, 2014 are described in the People’s Net, the online publication of the CCP on February 2, 2015.236
The fifth feature of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is that it has resulted in the investigation of 71 civilian “tigers” or officials of viceministerial rank or above and 30 military “tigers” in the PLA during its
first two and a quarter years. WANG Qishan, the CCDI’s Secretary, has
explained that “catching the tigers is a way to intimidate others” since the
objective of the CCDI investigators is to ensure that officials “don’t dare
to commit corruption, cannot be corrupt, and don’t want to be corrupt.”237 Table 8 provides details of the 71 civilian “tigers” investigated
by the CCDI for corruption offenses from December 2012 to March
2015.
Table 8: Senior officials investigated by the CCDI, December 2012 to
March 2015
No.

Name

Position

1
2

LI Chuncheng
YI Junqing

3

WU Yongwen

Deputy Party Secretary, Sichuan Province
Chief of CCP Central Compilation and
Translation Bureau
Vice-Chairman, Hubei Provincial People’s
Congress

Date of
Dismissal or
Investigation
December 2012
January 2013
January 2013

236. Frank Fang, “Setting a trap for China’s corrupt officials,” Epoch Times, February 4,
2015.
237. Ibid.
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4

LIU Tienan

5
6
7

NI Fake
GUO Yongxiang
WANG Suyi

8

LI Daqiu

9
10

WANG
Yongchun
LI Huanlin

11

JIANG Jiemin

12
13
14

LIAO Shaohua
JI Jianye
CHEN Baihuai

15

GUO Youming

16

XU Jie

17

CHEN Anzhong

18

YANG Gang

19

LI Chongxi

20

TONG Mingqian

21
22
23

LI Dongsheng
JI Wenlin
JIN Daoming

24

ZHU Zuoli

25

ZHOU Zhenhong

26
27
28

SHEN Peiping
YAO Mugen
SHEN Weichen

29
30

SONG Lin
MAO Xiaobing

31

WEI Jian

Deputy Director, National Development
and Reform Commission
Vice-Governor of Anhui Province
Vice-Governor of Sichuan Province
Minister of United Front of Inner
Mongolia
Vice-Chairman, People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Guanxi
Deputy General Manager, China National
Petroleum Corporation
Deputy General Manager, China National
Petroleum Corporation
Director, State-Owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission
Party Secretary, Zunyi City, Guizhou
Mayor of Nanjing City, Jiangsu
Vice-Chairman, People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Hubei
Deputy Governor of Hubei Province
Deputy Director, State Bureau for Letters
and Calls
Vice-Chairman, Jiangsi Provincial
People’s Congress
Deputy Director, Committee for Economic
Affairs of Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference
Chairman, People’s Political Consultative
Conference of Sichuan
Vice-Chairman, People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Hunan
Vice-Minister of Public Security
Vice-Governor of Hainan Province
Vice-Chairman, Shanxi Provincial
People’s Congress
Vice-Chairman, People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Shaanxi
Province
Head, United Front Work Department of
CCP of Guangdong Provincial Committee
Vice-Governor of Yunnan Province
Vice-Governor of Jiangxi Province
Vice-Chairman, Chinese Association for
Science and Technology
Chairman of China Resources Holdings
Party Secretary, Xining City, Qinghai
Province
Director, CCDI No. 4 Office of Discipline
Inspection and Improvement

May 2013
June 2013
June 2013
June 2013
July 2013
August 2013
August 2013
September
2013
October 2013
October 2013
November
2013
November
2013
November
2013
December 2013
December 2013

December 2013
December 2013
December 2013
February 2014
February 2014
February 2014

February 2014
March 2014
March 2014
April 2014
April 2014
April 2014
May 2014
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YANG Hanzhong

33

LI Yali

34

CHEN Zengxin

35

QI Pingjing

36

LI Xinghua

37
38

LIANG Daoxing
YANG Dacai

39

LEI Zhengfu

40

DUAN Yizhong

41

ZHENG Beiquan

42

SHAN Zengde

43

YANG Baohua

44
45

FANG Xuan
SU Rong

46
47

DU Shanxue
LING Zhengce

48

WAN Qingliang

49

ZHAO Zhiyong

50

TAN Qiwei

51

ZHANG Tianxin

52

HAN Xiancong

53

WU Changsun

54

CHEN Tiexin

Vice-Secretary, Commission for Political
and Legal Affairs, CCP Inner Mongolia
Committee
Deputy Police Chief of Taiyuan, Shanxi
Province
Party official, Shanwei, Guangdong
Province
Deputy Director, China Foreign
Languages Publishing Administration
Director, Guangdong Provincial
Department of Science and Technology
Vice-Mayor, Shenzhen City
Director, Shaanxi Administration of Work
Safety
Party Secretary, Beibei District,
Chongqing
Inspector, Bureau of Quality and
Technical Supervision Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region
Vice-Mayor and Police Chief, Yingde,
Guangdong Province
Deputy Director, Agricultural Department
of Shandong Provincial Government
Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Hunan
Province
Deputy Party Secretary, Guangzhou
Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference National
Committee
Vice-Governor of Shanxi Province
Vice-Chairman, People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Shanxi
Province
Party Secretary, Guangzhou City,
Guangdong Province
Secretary-General, Party Committee,
Jiangxi Province
Deputy Director, People’s Congress of
Chongqing
Member, Standing Committee, Yunnan
Province
Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Anhui
Province
Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Tianjin
Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference of Liaoning
Province

May 2014

May 2014
May 2014
May 2014
May 2014
May 2014
May 2014
May 2014
May 2014

May 2014
May 2014
May 2014

May 2014
June 2014

June 2014
June 2014

June 2014
June 2014
July 2014
July 2014
July 2014

July 2014
July 2014
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TAN Hong

56
57

TAN Li
ZHOU Yongkang

58

LING Jihua

59
60
61
62

ZHANG
Kunsheng
CAI Guangliao
YANG Weize
SI Xinliang

63

JING Chunhua

64
65

QIU He
XU Jianyi

66
67

LIAO Yongyuan
DAI Haibo

68

LIU Xiangdong

69

QI Dacai

70
71

CUI Jian
XU Gang

Senior Officer, Guard Bureau, Ministry of
Public Security
Vice-Governor of Hainan Province
Member, Standing Committee of Politburo
and Secretary, Political and Legislative
Affairs Committee of CCP Central
Committee
Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference National
Committee
Assistant Foreign Minister
Major General, Paramilitary Armed Police
Party Secretary, Nanjing City
Vice-President, Zhejiang Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference
Member, Standing Committee, Hebei
Provincial Party Committee
Deputy Party Chief, Yunnan Province
Chairman, State-owned China FAW
Group
Vice-Chairman, PetroChina
Executive Deputy Director, Shanghai Free
Trade Zone
Head, Environmental Protection Agency,
Shanxi Province
Vice-President and Director, Southern
Power Grid, Guandong Province
Vice-President, China Baosteel Group
Deputy Governor, Fujian Province

July 2014
July 2014
July 2014

December 2014

January 2015
January 2015
January 2015
February 2015
March 2015
March 2015
March 2015
March 2015
March 2015
March 2015
March 2015
March 2015
March 2015

Sources: Compiled by the author from Chen, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s AntiCorruption Campaign,” p. 3; Guo Yong and Li Songfeng, “Anti-Corruption Measures in
China: Suggestions for Reforms,” Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (1) (January 2015): 11-12; and newspaper reports.

Table 9 identifies the 30 military “tigers” and their positions in the
PLA before their investigation by the CCDI in 2014 and 2015. The PLA
is “riddled with corruption and professional decay, and asphyxiated by
the ever-greater effort required to impose political control.”238 Military
corruption is a serious problem because XU Caihou, the former CMC’s
Vice-Chairman, had built a corrupt culture in the PLA because the criteria for recruitment and allocation of positions were based on the amount
of bribes offered and the candidates’ relations with the military leaders.
Major General YANG Chunchang, a former aide to Xu, said that it was
238. John Garnaut, “Rotting from within: Investigating the massive corruption of the Chinese military,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2012.
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“an open secret that there are different price levels of bribery for promotion to different military ranks.”239 Xu was investigated for corruption by
the CCDI in March 2014 and expelled from the CCP in October 2014.
He died of bladder cancer while in custody on March 15, 2015.
Table 9: PLA officers investigated by the CCDI, 2014 to March 2015
No.
1.
2.
3.

Name
LIU Zheng
YU Daqing
FAN Changmi

4.
5.
6.
7.

WANG Minggui
FANG Wenping
WEI Jin
YE Wanyong

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

YANG Jinshan
ZHANG Qibin
FU Linguo
DAI Weimin
GAO Xiaoyan

13.

MA Xiangdong

14.

ZHANG Daixin

15.
16.
17.

CHEN Qiang
XU Caihou
ZHU Heping

18.

WANG Aiguo

19.

HUANG Xianjun

20.

DUAN Tianjie

21.
22.

YUAN Shijun
HUANG Xing

23.

ZHANG
Dongshui
LIU Hongjie

24.

Military Position before Investigation
Deputy Head, PLA General Logistics Department
Deputy Political Commissar, Second Artillery Force
Deputy Political Commissar, Lanzhou Military Area
Command
Political Commissar, Air Force Command School
Head, Military Command, Shanxi
Deputy Political Commissar, Tibet Military Command
Political Commissar, Sichuan Provincial Military Command,
Chengdu
Deputy Commander, Chengdu Military Area Command
Deputy Chief of Staff, Jinan Military Area Command
Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA General Logistics Department
Deputy President, PLA Nanjing Political College
Deputy Political Commissar and Chief of Discipline Inspection, PLA Information Engineering University
Head, Political Affairs Department, PLA Nanjing Political
College
Deputy Commander, Heilongjiang Provincial Military Command
Deputy Head, PLA Unit 96301
Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission
Director, Joint Logistics Department, Chengdu Military Area
Command
Director, Joint Logistics Department, Shenyang Military Area
Command
Director, Political Department, Shanxi Provincial Military
Command
Deputy Director, Political Department, PLA National Defense
University
Commander, Hubei Provincial Military Command
Director, Research Instruction Department, PLA Academy of
Military Sciences
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA Second Artillery Force
Deputy Director, Management and Support Department, PLA
General Staff Headquarters

239. “PLA delegates support ongoing anti-graft efforts,” Global Times, March 10, 2015.
See also, “PLA anti-corruption campaign shows determination to combat issue,” Global
Times, March 15, 2015.
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25.
26.

CHENG Jie
CHEN Jianfeng

27.

CHEN Hongyan

28.

WANG Sheng

29.

GUO Zhenggang

30.

LAN Weijie

Deputy Chief of Staff, North China Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy
Deputy Director, Joint Logistics Department, PLA Guangzhou
Military Area Command
Deputy Director, Political Department, Air Force, PLA Beijing
Military Area Command
Director, Logistics Department, Air Force, PLA Guangzhou
Military Area Command
Deputy Political Commissar, Zhejiang Provincial Military
Command
Deputy Commander, Hubei Provincial Military Command

Sources: Compiled from the information provided by Xinhua News Agency on January
16 and March 2, 2015; Catherine Wong Tsoi-lai, “16 PLA officers on graft list,” Global
Times, January 16, 2015; and Catherine Wong Tsoi-lai, “Military probes 14 senior PLA
officers for graft,” Global Times, March 3, 2015.

An important objective of President Xi’s campaign is to show the
citizens that he is concerned about curbing corruption in China by “bagging big tigers.” However, Wedeman warns that “bagging too many big
tigers can backfire if the public becomes convinced” that “the party’s
jungle is full of big tigers, senior leadership is full of corrupt tigers, and
that the only big tigers being hunted are Xi’s political enemies and the
politically unlucky and unloved whom Xi had sacrificed.”240
From January to November 2013, the procuratorates investigated
2,703 officials at division level and 204 officials at bureau level and
above, and 17 ministerial officials. Table 10 shows that during HU
Jintao’s second term (2008-2012), the procuratorates investigated 13,173
division and county officials, 950 bureau officials and 30 ministerial officials, or an annual average of 2,635 division and county officials, 190
bureau officials and six ministerial officials. Thus, in terms of output, the
number of officials at all levels investigated by the procuratorates in
2013 has exceeded their average annual output during 2008 to 2012.
Table 10: Number of Officials Investigated by the Procuratorates in
China by Level, 2008-2013
No. of officials investigated
Division level and above
Bureau level and above
Ministry level and above
Total

2008
2,687
181
4
2,872

2009
2,670
204
8
2,882

2010
2,723
188
6
2,917

2011
2,524
198
7
2,729

2012
2,569
179
5
2,753

2013
2,703
204
17
2,924

Source: Compiled from data provided by the SPP, quoted in Chen, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi
Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” p. 7, Chart 1.

240. Wedeman, “Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt and the Politics of Corruption,” 6.
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In sum, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is different from previous
campaigns by its length, its focus on curbing official extravagance on
cars, banquets and overseas travel, its reliance on inspection teams to uncover corruption cases, and its investigation of more “tigers” and “flies”
during its first two and a quarter years.

VI. EVALUATION OF XI JINPING’S ANTI-CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGN
A.

Utility of Mass Campaigns in China

How useful are the mass campaigns in China? In July 1957, ZHOU
Enlai, the PRC’s first premier, had endorsed the utility of campaigns for
fostering China’s socialist transformation.241 Based on his analysis of 36
campaigns conducted in China from April 1950 to December 1971, Cell
concluded that campaigns were useful for attaining China’s goal of socialist transformation, with the struggle campaigns being the most important despite their greater shortcomings. These shortcomings resulted
from their high levels of mobilization and “over-classification, physical
abuse, and the use of coercion instead of persuasion.”242 On the other
hand, with the exception of the Great Leap Forward, the economic campaigns had fewer weaknesses and were the most effective. Ideological
campaigns were the least useful because of the low level of achievements, shortcomings and mobilization.243 However, he cautioned that
China’s campaign mobilization strategy was not a “blueprint for action
for other societies” because of the “differences between societies in culture, history, and natural environment.”244
Since mass campaigns in China have stirred political controversy
among many scholars, Bennett has succinctly summarized the three criticisms as well as the supporting arguments for such campaigns. The first
criticism was that mass campaigns were “effective as a leadership strategy only temporarily under conditions of great stress” because they were
appropriately used by the CCP and PLA in their mountainous rural base
in the 1930s and 1940s. Secondly, critics argued that mass campaigns
were incompatible with China’s growing industrialization which requires
“elaborate training and specialization” and moving away from political

241.
242.
243.
244.

Cell, Revolution at Work, p. 171.
Ibid., pp. 130-131, and 172.
Ibid., p. 172.
Ibid., p. 175.
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indoctrination.245 Third, China’s “excessive emphasis on political priorities and hostility toward bureaucratic authority and professionalism” had
to be curbed by reducing the number of campaigns and their hostility toward professionalism.246
In his study of a central ministry in China, A. Doak Barnett observed that the effects of political campaigns within the bureaucracy
were “subtle and far-reaching.” This is because “by dramatically demonstrating the Party’s power to determine the fate of every cadre, and by
clearly defining attitudes and behavior that are unacceptable to the Party,” these campaigns “create strong incentives for all cadres to submit to
the Party’s authority” to reduce the risks of being punished.247 However,
apart from reinforcing the CCP’s authority, the reliance on these campaigns has also incurred “significant costs and liabilities”: the disruption
of the normal tasks of government and Party administration; neglecting
problems not highlighted by the current campaigns; waste of time and
effort because the cadres were diverted from their regular work; and inhibiting “the development of an effective government administration of a
more routinized sort.”248
Barnett concluded that even though campaigns “played an extraordinary role in the operational dynamics of the bureaucracy in China,” the
regime found it “increasingly difficult to mobilize the cadres and inject a
high level of tension into the system.” This is because they adapted to the
repeated campaigns by developing defense mechanisms to avoid the
same degree of psychological involvement.249 Lynn White contends that
China’s reliance on campaigns “suggests that regular, reliable legal punishments must be ineffective.”250
On the other hand, supporters observed that China had to rely on
mass mobilization of labor power after the CCP assumed power to construct public works, irrigation systems and flood control projects because
the country lacked the required financial resources to invest in these projects. Furthermore, mass campaigns were emphasized in China during
the early 1960s to foster the spirit of self-reliance, which was proclaimed
as a national goal after the collapse of Sino-Soviet economic coopera-

245. Bennett, Yundong, p. 79.
246. Ibid., p. 80.
247. A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 34-35.
248. Ibid., p. 142.
249. Ibid., p. 70.
250. Lynn T. White, “Political Mechanisms and Corruption,” in Gregory C. Chow and
Dwight H. Perkins (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Economy (London: Routledge,
2015), p. 292.

HUNTING THE CORRUPT “TIGERS” AND “FLIES” IN CHINA

57

tion. Thirdly, proponents argued that mass campaigns had enhanced development by removing bottlenecks caused by “established cliques, privilege, and administrative routine.” Finally, advocates contended that
mass campaigns were an effective way for solving existing problems if
they were not excessive and “rhythmically in cycles of tension and relaxation.”251
B.

Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign

In his review of the literature on communication campaigns in China, WANG Jianglong found that “systematic evaluations with reliable
and valid measurements are seriously lacking” because researchers relied
on “mostly anecdotal reports, official Chinese government publications,
and other less-reliable sources to gauge the effectiveness of communication campaigns in the PRC.”252 For example, Robert Bishop has argued
that those campaigns in China which attempted to change the targets’ attitudes achieved minimum or superficial effects, while those campaigns
which targeted behavioural changes accomplished campaign objectives
temporarily because of the campaign targets’ reluctance to reveal their
true feelings.253
What has been the impact of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign? The
first two and a quarter years of the campaign have not made a significant
impact on China’s perceived extent of corruption, judging from its performance on Transparency International’s CPI and PERC’s surveys of
corruption from 2012-2015, as shown in Table 11. As indicated at the
outset of this analysis, China’s drop in rank from 80th to 100th positions
and score from 40 to 36 on the 2014 CPI was unexpected and not well
received by the PRC government.
Table 11: Perceived Level of Corruption in China according to three
indicators, 1995-2015
Year
1995
1996
1997

Corruption
Perceptions Index
40/41 (2.16)
50/54 (2.43)
41/85 (2.88)

Political & Economic
Risk Consultancy
10/11 (7.30)
12/12 (8.00)
10/12 (8.06)

World Bank Control
of Corruption
NA
43.90 (-0.25)
NA

251. Bennett, Yundong, pp. 80-85.
252. Jianglong Wang, “Research on Chinese Communication Campaigns: A Historical
Review,” in Wenshan Jia, Xing Lu and D. Ray Heisey (Eds.), Chinese Communications Theory and Research: Reflections, New Frontiers, and New Directions (Westport, CT: Ablex,
2002), p. 139.
253. Robert L. Bishop, Qi Lai! Mobilizing one billion Chinese: The Chinese Communication System (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1989).
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1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

52/85 (3.5)
58/90 (3.4)
63/90 (3.1)
57/91 (3.5)
59/102 (3.5)
66/133 (3.4)
71/146 (3.4)
78/159 (3.2)
70/163 (3.3)
72/180 (3.5)
72/180 (3.6)
79/180 (3.6)
78/178 (3.5)
75/183 (3.6)
80/176 (39)
80/177 (40)
100/175 (36)
NA

6/12 (6.97)
10/12 (9.00)
9/12 (9.11)
7/12 (7.88)
7/12 (7.00)
8/12 (8.33)
9/14 (7.48)
10/14 (7.68)
11/15 (7.58)
9/16 (6.29)
12/16 (7.98)
12/16 (7.30)
10/16 (6.70)
11/16 (7.93)
12/16 (7.00)
11/16 (7.79)
10/16 (7.10)
11/16 (6.98)

45.85 (-0.25)
NA
50.73 (-0.24)
NA
33.66 (-0.65)
43.41 (-0.41)
34.63 (-0.56)
31.71 (-0.64)
37.07 (-0.51)
33.50 (-0.59)
35.44 (-0.54)
34.93 (-0.54)
32.38 (-0.60)
35.07 (-0.55)
39.23 (-0.48)
46.89
NA
NA

Sources: Compiled from http://www.transparency.org for the CPI rankings and scores
from 1995-2014; Asian Intelligence, No. 579, March 7, 2001, p. 2; Asian Intelligence,
No. 750, March 12, 2008, p. 7; Asian Intelligence, No. 871, March 20, 2013, p. 6; Asian
Intelligence, No. 895, March 19, 2014, p. 1; Asian Intelligence, No. 920, April 1, 2015, p.
1; and http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports.

On the other hand, the measures introduced to minimize the three
“public expenses” – the public officials’ reliance on official cars, banquets and overseas trips – have been effective in reducing such expenditures. According to the CCDI, about 20,000 officials were punished in
2013 for decadence and the violation of the “Eight Directives.” Among
them, more than 5,000 officials had broken the regulations concerning
the use of official cars and 903 officials had organized “overly elaborate”
celebrations.254 On March 15, 2014, the CCDI reported on its website
that the expenditure on meetings in 2013 declined by 53 percent, followed by a decrease of 39 percent for official overseas trips, and a drop
of 10 percent for vehicle purchases.255
The effectiveness of the regulations for curbing official extravagance manifests in the effects on China’s economic growth and changes
in the behavior of the corrupt officials. The short term impact of the anticorruption campaign is the reduction of economic growth in China in
2014 by between 0.6 and 1.5 percent, according to LU Ting, a Bank of
America analyst, with the decline in sales of luxury watches, penthouses,
cars and other status symbols caused by the official curb on extrava254. Ben Blanchard, “China punishes 20,000 officials for being too bureaucratic,” Reuters,
December 2, 2013.
255. “Austerity drive hits official spending,” Straits Times, March 17, 2014, p. A11.
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gance.256 China’s annual growth rate for luxury spending decreased from
7 percent in 2012 to 2 percent in 2013.257 The sales of jewelry, watches
and other luxury items in Hong Kong have declined by 40 percent in
April 2014, and by 28 percent in June 2014.258
The crackdown on official extravagance has also resulted in the decline in the hosting of official dinners at five-star hotels in China. The
average spending per person at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Shanghai has
decreased from 1,000 yuan in 2012 to between 600 to 700 yuan in 2014.
The liquor company Remy Cointreau blames the anti-graft campaign for
the 32 percent drop in the sales of its high-end brand, Remy Martin in
China, during January to March 2014.259 The shipment of cognac in
China has also decreased by 20 percent.260 The Scotch Whiskey Association reported that the sales of whiskey in China declined by 11 percent
from January to June 2014 as a result of the “anti-extravagance
measures.”261 To cope with the drastic drop in patronage by officials,
high-end restaurants in Beijing have removed expensive and exotic dishes from their menus. Beijing’s Xiang E. Qing Restaurant, which was a
favorite of CCP cadres before the anti-graft campaign, replaced shark’s
fin soup, bird’s nest soup and abalone with “less exotic fare such as
shredded beef, pickled turnip and fried peanuts.”262 The sales of
mooncakes in Guangdong Province dropped drastically after the CCDI
banned the use of public funds to purchase mooncakes as gifts for the
mid-Autumn festival.263
XI Jinping himself set an example by having a simple dinner of
“four dishes and one soup” during his official visit to Fuping county in
Hebei Province in late December 2012.264 Xi’s simple menu was prescribed earlier by the 1988 national campaign to curb public waste and
256. Bob Davis, “Anti-graft push could have big impact on China’s economy,” Wall Street
Journal, August 21, 2014.
257. Rennie Whang, “Singapore firms hit by cut in China’s spending,” Straits Times, June
7, 2014, p. C9.
258. Kate O’Keefee, “Wary high-rollers shy away from Macau’s casinos,” Wall Street
Journal, August 1, 2014.
259. “Less is more for China’s luxury businesses,” Straits Times, May 27, 2014, p. A18.
260. Jacqueline Nelson, “Corruption and Cognac: China’s crackdown hits luxury,” The
Globe and Mail, August 20, 2014.
261. Fred Barbash, “Sales of Scotch and other luxury items down—thanks to China’s corruption crackdown,” Washington Post, September 23, 2014.
262. “China’s crackdown on extravagance means abalone off the menu,” Associated Press,
September 4, 2013.
263. “Mooncake sales in China plunge after anti-graft agency bans use of public funds to
buy them,” Straits Times, September 6, 2014.
264. Brian Spegele, “Xi eats plainly amid focus on official waistlines,” Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2012.
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extravagance, which reduced the 10 to 15 dishes usually served at banquets to four dishes and a soup.265 However, the high-profile case of
HAN Junhong, the Party Secretary of Wangluo, a town in Henan Province, who was suspended for not paying his bills of 700,000 yuan
(US$115,000) over three years at a pig trotter restaurant, illustrates the
persistence of “wasteful spending and corruption” in China.266 In January 2015, 14 Shenzhen police officers were suspended for assaulting
three undercover journalists who caught them feasting on a giant salamander at a lavish banquet attended by 28 officials from the Shenzhen
Police Department.267
On December 18, 2013, the State Council circulated guidelines for
“funeral and internment reform” to ensure that CCP members and officials set an example for others by having “simple, civilized funerals
without monumental gravestones, fireworks and the practice of collecting gifts (bribes).”268 Consequently, ZHANG Hongbao, the owner of the
Shanghai Funeral Service, claims that his profits have decreased by 20
percent in 2013 because government officials now “choose simple ceremonies, such as having quieter events, rather than the noisy rituals of the
past.”269
The frugality campaign was demonstrated clearly at the annual
meetings of the NPC held in Beijing in March 2013 and March 2014.
Fifteen frugality measures were introduced to improve the conduct of the
2013 NPC. Among the 17 frugality measures implemented at the 2014
NPC was the reduction of the number of “tea ladies” since the delegates
were served bottled water instead of tea. To reduce waste, there were no
red carpets or welcome banners at the hotel lobbies and fruit platters
were no longer provided in the hotel rooms. Gift-giving and lavish welcome ceremonies were banned and delegates were served buffet meals
without expensive food or wine.270
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has also changed the behavior of corrupt officials in four ways. First, many corrupt officials who have visited
the casinos in Macau since 2009 to gamble or launder money have
265. T. Wing Lo, Corruption and Politics in Hong Kong and China (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 1993), p. 63.
266. “China official suspended over pig trotter banquet bills,” BBC News China, October
28, 2013.
267. William Wan and Gu Jinglu, “Chinese officers caught feasting on an endangered salamander,” Washington Post, January 27, 2015.
268. Christina Larson, “China’s anti-graft campaign bans luxury funerals,” Bloomberg
Business, December 20, 2013.
269. “Funeral business hard hit by anti-graft drive,” Straits Times, March 4, 2014, p. A10.
270. Esther Teo, “Beijing steps up frugality drive to clean up image,” Straits Times, March
10, 2014, p. A12.
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stopped doing so after the initiation of the anti-corruption campaign in
November 2012. Discretionary spending by Chinese high-rollers, which
included many corrupt officials, increased Macau’s gambling revenue in
2012 to US$38 billion.271 However, casino revenue in Macau decreased
in June and July 2014 by 3.6 percent from 2013 since high-rollers from
China stayed away. In July 2014, the revenue from VIP gamblers from
China declined by 14 to 18 percent.272 The gross gambling revenue in
Macau fell by 23.2 percent in October 2014 and by 19.6 percent in November 2014 compared to the same period in 2013.273 Hoffman Ma,
Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Ponte 16 Resort in Macau, observes
that the high rollers are “spending less to avoid drawing attention amid
the government’s fierce anti-corruption campaign.”274 Consequently, the
Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau in Macau reported that the
highest decrease in casino revenue was 30.4 percent in December 2014
and the annual revenue for 2013 dropped by 2.6 percent to 351.5 billion
patacas (US$44 billion).275 In January 2015, the gaming revenue in Macau dropped by 17.4 percent to 23.7 billion patacas (US$3 billion).276
The second way in which corrupt officials in China have changed as
a result of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is that they have become more cautious in accepting bribes or helping their relatives and friends to avoid
detection and punishment. CHEN Jin has offered a bribe of 100,000 yuan
(US$16,000) to enroll her 12-year old daughter in a top middle school in
a city in Hebei Province but no official has accepted her offer after four
months. Furthermore, CAI Xiaopeng, a businessman in Beijing, has admitted that he usually spends a million yuan a year to bribe more than
100 officials from many departments. However, because he has received
fewer calls from officials requesting gifts before the mid-Autumn festival
in 2014, he saved 800,000 yuan in bribes last year. To avoid getting
caught, corrupt officials are more cautious now and only accept bribes
from those they trust and also demand higher amounts. A jeweller from
Henan Province said that he had to pay three times more than the usual
bribe to get a permit to open a new shop.277
271. Chen Gang, “Xi Jinping’s Campaign against Corruption,” EAI Background Brief, No.
839 (Singapore: East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, August 7, 2013), p. 10.
272. O’Keefee, “Wary high-rollers shy away from Macau’s casinos.”
273. Stuart Leavenworth, “China’s corruption crackdown takes toll on Macau’s U.S.owned casinos,” McClatchy DC, December 5, 2014.
274. Frank Langfitt, “China’s corruption crackdown pummels Macau’s casinos,” NPR
(National Public Radio), November 7, 2014.
275. “Worst year for Macau casinos,” Straits Times, January 3, 2015, p. A31.
276. “Macau casinos’ losing streak continues,” Straits Times, February 3, 2015, p. A20.
277. Keith Zhai, “‘I will not give up’ says Chinese mother who can’t find anyone to bribe
for daughter’s schooling,” Bloomberg News, January 23, 2015.
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The third change is that local officials are reluctant to perform their
regular duties for fear of being punished for making mistakes and also
because there is no longer any financial incentive for them to implement
large investment projects. An official in Beijing admitted that “nobody
wants to do anything” because “if we do things, we are exposed to all
kinds of risks, including political risks. And we don’t have financial incentives.”278 Consequently, the reluctance of local officials to perform
their functions has delayed the implementation of many projects. Accordingly, on February 9, 2015 Premier LI Keqiang asked local officials
to sign a written pledge to implement major economic and social policies
faithfully because their dereliction of duty has delayed the implementation of large projects and investment plans in the agricultural and water
conservation industries.279 PEI Minxin contends that local officials have
reacted to Xi’s anti-graft campaign by engaging in “passive resistance”
because he “has taken away their cheese without offering anything in return.” The local officials are engaged in a test of wills with XI Jinping
because they know that the CCP’s survival will be threatened if “they
stopped working indefinitely and the economy sank.” They demand to be
allowed to return to their corrupt ways because “if you don’t allow us to
have a comfortable, corrupt life, we are not going to work for you.”280
The fourth effect of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is that it has increased the number of suicides among corrupt officials in China. In
2013, of the 54 officials who died from “unnatural deaths” (including
over-drinking and accidents), 23 officials committed suicide.281 The media in China reported that 30 officials committed suicide from January to
September 2014. This figure indicates that the suicide rate among senior
Chinese officials is 30 percent higher than the suicide rate in China’s cities. On January 31, 2015, Peng Pai, a new-state-funded online media outlet, reported that 77 people killed themselves during 2013 and 2014
compared to 68 persons during 2003 to 2012.282
Corrupt officials commit suicide not only to avoid long prison
terms, public shame and loss of face, but also to protect their wives, chil-

278. Simon Denyer, “Without corruption, some ask, can the Chinese Communist Party
function?” Washington Post, February 11, 2015.
279. Zhao Yinan, “Local officials neglect duties, premier says,” China.Daily.com.cn, February 10, 2015.
280. Quoted in Denyer, “Without corruption, some ask, can the Chinese Communist Party
function?”
281. Dexter Roberts, “As the anti-graft campaign widens, Chinese officials commit suicide,” Bloomberg Business, April 11, 2014.
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dren and parents so that they will “survive and not lose their wealth.”283
As disciplinary investigations are terminated with the deaths of the prime
suspects, some corrupt officials choose to commit suicide to prevent
bringing shame to their families. Thus, the suicides of corrupt Chinese
officials reflect not only the psychological impact of Xi’s anti-graft campaign, but also the limited care and help available for depressed officials.284 As many officials had previously tried to commit suicide by hitting their heads against the walls in the interview rooms, Professor LIN
Zhe of the Central Party School revealed that the interview rooms at the
disciplinary detention center in Shanghai have soft rubber walls to prevent officials who are interrogated from committing suicide.285
A final unintended consequence of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is
that it has led to a decline between 10 to 37 percent in the number of job
applications for the civil service in 16 provinces and municipalities. The
highest decrease occurred in Zheijiang Province where the number of
persons sitting for the annual entrance examination decreased from
360,000 in March 2013 to 227,000 in March 2014 .286 The number of
persons taking the national civil service examination in China has decreased from 1.12 million in 2013 to 900,000 in 2014. A recent online
survey conducted by the China Youth Daily found that 51.6 percent of
the respondents admitted that the anti-corruption campaign was the most
important reason for the drop in the number of applicants to join the civil
service.
The “Eight Directives” and curbs on official extravagance have reduced the attractiveness of a civil service career because of the absence
of the “hidden benefits” of being an official, which include “lavish banquet meals and government-sponsored stays in luxury hotels.”287 Without these extra benefits and perks, the actual monthly salaries of civil
servants are very low. Hence, it is not surprising that in April 2013, five
months after the initiation of Xi’s anti-graft campaign, a journalist has
described the job of a Chinese government official as “one of the worst
jobs in the world.” The “life as a Chinese government official isn’t what

283. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Spate of suicides by Chinese officials tied to drive against
graft,” New York Times, September 11, 2014, p. 4.
284. Kor Kian Beng, “Deadly impact of anti-graft campaign,” Straits Times, April 18,
2014, p. A12.
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Chinese officials works,” Washington Post, July 3, 2014.
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2014, p. A13.
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Times, December 3, 2014.
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it used to be” because “lavish, liquor-heavy banquets have been outlawed” and it will also be harder to get those military license plates to
avoid dealing with the traffic police.288
C.

Treating Symptoms but not Causes of Corruption

Since corruption is a difficult problem to solve, many countries
have failed in their anti-corruption efforts partly because their efforts
have focused on the symptoms of corruption instead of its causes. Steven
Levitt and Stephen Dubner explain why it is easier to deal with the
symptoms of corruption than with addressing its root causes:
But the big problems that society cares about — crime and disease and political dysfunction, for instance — are more complicated than that. Their root causes are often not so nearby, or
obvious, or palatable. So rather than address their root causes,
we often spend billions of dollars treating the symptoms and
are left to grimace when the problem remains. . . . Alas, fixing
corruption is a lot harder than airlifting food. . . . But when you
are dealing with root causes, at least you know you are fighting
the real problem and not just boxing with shadows.289
XI Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign’s emphasizes treating the
symptoms of corruption without addressing its causes, which makes it
the campaign’s Achilles’ heel. This may also explain why the campaign
has been ineffective in minimizing corruption in China during its first
two and a quarter years. This limitation is not surprising since as Bennett
has astutely observed, the fourth objective of a mass campaign was the
correction of deviations from important public norms. “The tasks of yundong in the correcting deviations category are to draw such deviations
into the open, raise popular awareness of the political implications of indulging in the deviant practices, and finally, try to stamp them out.”
However, “often the announced deviations superficially appear to be
mere symptoms, and yundong run to suppress them seem to toy with the
symptoms alone instead of squarely addressing the basic causes.”290
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290. Bennett, Yundong, p. 58.
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Low salaries

There are five major causes of corruption in China.291 As discussed
in Section II.B, the low salaries of public officials in imperial China were
responsible for their corrupt behavior. After the readjustment of salaries
in 1956, the average salaries of administrative cadres were not “exceptionally high.” For example, the minister’s monthly salary was only 400
yuan, whereas a bureau chief earned between 200 to 250 yuan per
month.292 The salaries of public officials in contemporary China are still
low and explain why to a large extent they are corrupt. Senior officials
have tolerated low salaries during the reform period because they could
compensate the difference through “corruption with relatively little
chance of getting caught.”293 Many officials have engaged in such illegal
strategies such as embezzlement and commercial activities to supplement
their low official incomes.294 The rampant corruption among the managers of the SOEs is the result of their low salaries and their unfettered control over the economic resources of their organizations.295
Table 12 shows that the average annual salary of employees in the
public sector in China was lower than the average annual salary of employees in nine other sectors from 2003 to 2007. In 2009, public sector
salaries were ranked ninth, but their ranking dropped to 11th position in
2010. The average annual salary of civil servants increased by two and a
half times from 15,355 yuan (or 1,280 yuan per month) in 2003 to 38,242
yuan (or 3,187 yuan per month) in 2010. As mentioned earlier, the anticorruption campaign has reduced the attractiveness of the civil service as
an employer in China because of the curb on official extravagance and
other perks. The average monthly salary of a department head in the central government in 2014 was 3,000 yuan (US$480) while a department
head at the provincial level earned an average of 2,000 yuan (US$320) a
month.296
In 1981, Harry Harding astutely attributed the problem of corruption in China to these two structural causes: “when the opportunity is

291. For a comprehensive analysis of these five causes, see Quah, Minimizing Corruption
in China, pp. 41-58.
292. Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, p. 41.
293. John P. Burns, “Rewarding Comrades at the Top in China,” in Christopher Hood and
B. Guy Peters with Grace O.M. Lee (eds.), Reward for High Public Office: Asian and Pacific
Rim States (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 63.
294. John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” Australian Journal of
Chinese Affairs, 18 (July 1987): 79-80.
295. Wenhao Cheng,” An Empirical Study of Corruption within China’s State-owned Enterprises,” China Review, 4 (2) (Fall 2004): 63-65
296. Chang, “‘Gold rice bowl’ losing its lustre in China,” p. A13.
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present,” there are weak penalties, ineffective monitoring mechanisms,
and bureaucratic discretion; and when the motivation is high with poorly
paid officials they are “strongly tempted to engage in graft or extortion.”297 The late LEE Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister, noted
that the adoption of market reforms in China resulted in the exponential
increase in corruption because “the salaries of ministers and officials
were paltry compared with the rest of society, which was growing rich
very rapidly.”298
Table 12: Average Annual Salary in Yuan in China by Sector,
2003-2010
Sector
Telecommunications and computer
service
Financial industry
Research and technological services
Electricity, gas and water utilities
Culture, sports and entertainment
Real estate
Tenancy and business services
Health, social security and social
welfare
Transport, storage and postal service
Public sector
Education
Mining
Manufacturing
Neighborhood services
Management of water resource and
public infrastructure
Construction
Hotel and catering services
Wholesale and retail trade
Agriculture, forestry and fishery
Average for all sectors

2003
30,897

2005
38,799

2007
47,700

2009
58,154

2010
64,436

20,780
20,442
18,574
17,098
17,085
17,020
16,185

29,229
27,155
24,750
22,670
20,253
21,233
20,808

44,011
38,432
33,470
30,430
26,085
27,807
27,892

60,398
50,143
41,869
37,755
32,242
35,494
35,662

70,146
56,376
47,309
41,428
35,870
39,566
40,232

15,753
15,355
14,189
13,627
12,671
12,665
11,774

20,911
20,234
18,259
20,449
15,934
15,747
14,322

29,903
27,731
25,908
28,185
21,144
20,370
18,383

35,315
35,326
34,543
38,038
26,810
25,172
23,159

40,466
38,242
38,968
44,196
30,916
28,206
25,544

11,328
11,198
10,894
6,884
13,969

14,112
13,876
15,256
8,207
18,200

18,482
17,046
21,074
10,847
24,721

24,161
20,860
29,139
14,356
32,244

27,529
23,382
33,635
16,717
36,539

Source: Compiled from Alfred M. Wu, Governing Civil Service Pay in China (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2014), pp. 167-168, Table 7.6.

2.

Red tape

Second, red tape and cumbersome procedures contribute to corruption by providing civil servants with the excuse to extort bribes from
297. Harding, Organizing China, pp. 7-8.
298. Lee, One Man’s View of the World, p. 18.
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those members of the public who are willing to pay “speed money” to
“cut” red tape and reduce delay by expediting their applications for permits or licenses.299 Red tape is a serious problem in China as reflected in
its performance on the World Bank’s ease of doing business rank from
2007-2015, as shown in Table 13. In 2007, China was ranked 93rd among
175 economies in terms of the ease of doing business rank. Its ease of
doing business rank gradually improved to 79th among 183 economies in
2011 but decreased to 96th position among 189 economies in 2014, and
90th position in 2015. More specifically, China’s rank for starting a business has worsened from 128th among 175 economies in 2007 to 158th
among 189 economies in 2014. However, in 2015, China’s rank for starting a business improved to 128th among 189 economies. Even though the
number of days needed to obtain a license was reduced from 367 days in
2007 to 244.3 days in 2015, China’s rank for dealing with licenses deteriorated from 153rd position to 179th position during the same period.
Similarly, China’s rank in registering property has also declined from
21st position in 2007 to 37th position in 2015.
Table 13: China’s Ease of Doing Business Rank, 2007-2015
Criterion
Ease of doing business rank

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

2015

93

83

83

89

79

91

91

96

90

Starting a business rank
Procedures (number)
Time (days)
Dealing with licenses rank
Procedures (number)
Time (days)

128
13
35
153
29
367

135
13
35
175
37
336

151
14
40
176
37
336

151
14
37
180
37
336

151
14
38
181
37
336

151
14
38
179
33
311

151
13
33
181
28
270

158
13
33
185
25
270

128
11
31.4
179
22
244.3

Registering property rank
Procedures (number)
Time (days)
Number of economies

21
3
32
175

29
4
29
178

30
4
29
181

32
4
29
183

38
4
29
183

40
4
29
183

44
4
29
185

48
4
29
189

37
4
19.5
189

Sources: World Bank, Doing Business 2007-2015 (Washington DC, 2006-2014), various
pages.

The problem of red tape in China is also reflected in the proliferation of administrative and operating fees, which are collected by the ministries, government bureaus, commissions and authorized organizations.
There were 340 administrative and operating fees authorized in 2002 by
the State Council, involving more than 50 ministries, bureaus and com-

299. Jon S.T. Quah, “Civil Service and Corruption,” in Anuradha K. Rajivan and Ramesh
Gampat (Eds.), Perspectives on Corruption and Human Development, Vol. 2 (Delhi: Macmillan Publishers India, 2009), pp. 820-821.
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missions. The provincial governments also authorized the payment of
several hundred fees.300 Needless to say, the collection of excessive fees
has increased business costs, the size of government as well as corruption. The fees collected are considered by government agencies, SOEs
and local governments as off-budget revenue (xiaojinku or “small coffers”), which is “often abused and used for lavish pursuits such as purchasing luxury vehicles” as well as “treating guests, purchasing presents,
personal uses, and paying bribes.”301
3.

Low probability of detection and punishment

The third cause of corruption in China is the low probability of detection and punishment for corrupt offenses. Corruption is perceived as a
“low risk, high reward” activity in China because corrupt offenders are
unlikely to be caught and punished. Gerard Lemos describes the CCP as
“remarkably tolerant and forgiving” because only two groups of corrupt
officials are punished: “those whose greed, dishonesty and exploitation
are so extreme and meretricious that they simply cannot be ignored and
those whose denigration for corruption is a devious proxy for settling
scores in a long-running factional fight.”302 With the low probability of
being caught and prosecuted for corrupt offenses, it is not surprising that
many officials, including senior CCP members, are willing to assume the
low risk for engaging in corrupt practices.303
Corruption in China deteriorated during 2005-2006 because the risk
of corrupt offenders being caught was significantly reduced due to the
time lag between the committing of the offense and the arrest of the offender increased from 20 months during 1992-1996 to 63 months during
2005-2006.304 Among the average number of 30,000 public officials
charged with economic crimes annually, more than 20,000 officials (66.7
percent) were remanded to the courts for trial, but only 5,000 officials
(16.7 percent) were imprisoned for five years or more.305 Among the
300. Lin Shuanglin, “Too Many Fees and Too Many Charges: China Streamlines Fiscal
System,” in John Wong and Lu Ding (Eds.), China’s Economy into the New Century: Structural Issues and Problems (Singapore: Singapore University Press and World Scientific Publishing, 2002), p. 179.
301. Ibid., pp. 186-189.
302. Gerard Lemos, The End of the Chinese Dream: Why Chinese People Fear the Future
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), p. 259.
303. John P. Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform,” in Jude Howell (Ed.), Governance in China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 43-44.
304. Andrew Wedeman, “China’s War on Corruption,” in Ting Gong and Stephen K. Ma
(Eds.), Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity (London:
Routledge, 2009), p. 26.
305. Ibid., p. 27.
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115,143 CCP members disciplined during 1992-2006, 44,836 (38.9 percent) were warned, and 32,289 (28 percent) of them were given a serious
warning. This means that two-thirds of those party members who were
disciplined “got away with only a mild to serious warning that appeared
to have no real punitive consequences.”306
What accounts for the low probability of detecting and punishing
corrupt officials in China? As mentioned earlier, the lack of public accountability enables officials to abuse their power to further their personal interests without fear of detection or punishment. Furthermore, the
CCP’s preferred option of relying on “internal resolution” instead of
criminal prosecution to deal with its corrupt members so as to avoid embarrassing the CCP reinforces the perception that they would be unlikely
to be caught or punished. Finally, the prevalence of bribery as a subculture among Chinese officials encourages them to believe that they would
not be caught or penalized since only those officials with “bad luck”
would be punished for their corrupt offenses.307 In sum, the combination
of increased opportunities for corruption after 1978 and the ineffective
anti-corruption measures mean that “engaging in corruption was a rational decision” for many Chinese officials because the costs of corruption were perceived to be much lower than the benefits.308
4.

Decentralization

The fourth cause of corruption in China is decentralization. Decentralization gives the power of the central government to local governments at the county and town levels so they can implement policies. In
addition, it grants managers of SOEs with decision-making autonomy,
meaning there is no accountability for their decisions. The most powerful
person at the county and township levels is the party committee secretary
or the “first hand.” He has the final authority in making all the major decisions, including personnel decisions affecting the officials and the implementation of national economic policies.309 The central government
relies on the local party secretaries to ensure control of the county and

306. Minxin Pei, “Fighting Corruption: A Difficult Challenge for Chinese Leaders,” in
Cheng Li (Ed.), China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 230-232.
307. Zhang, “White-Collar Crime,” pp. 28 and 33.
308. Chan Kin-man, “Corruption in China: A Principal-Agent Perspective,” in H.K. Wong
and Hon S. Chan (Eds.), Handbook of Public Administration in the Asia-Pacific Basin (New
York: Marcel Dekker, 1999), p. 318.
309. Zhong Yang, “Why China’s local officials do not always comply with Central Government Policies,” EAI Background Brief, No. 86 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National
University of Singapore, April 24, 2001), pp. 3-4.
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township governments. The unintended consequence of giving so much
power to the local party secretaries is their abuse of power. This allows
them to build their own “independent kingdoms” by circumventing or
disobeying the central government’s directives.310
The relationship between the central government and local governments in China depends on the issues involved. For critical issues like
the crackdown on the Falun Gong and the single child policy, the party
secretaries give top priority because they would be punished for any mistakes in policy implementation. Similarly, they also comply with meeting
the detailed requirements for implementing those policies with specific
quotas because their job performance is based on the attainment of such
quotas. Spotlight issues that are brought to the attention of the political
leaders by media exposure are usually resolved quickly by the local party
secretaries to avoid negative consequences for themselves. By contrast,
the local party secretaries usually ignore or pay lip service to general slogans or guideline issues without specific details or performance indicators because of the absence of negative consequences for noncompliance. As thousands of laws and regulations are passed by the
NPC, provincial people’s congresses and local congresses, the local party
secretaries routinely violate these laws and regulations because of their
“abuse of power, lack of a sense of the rule of law,” “ignorance of the
existence of these laws and regulations,” and the weak monitoring system. The non-implementation of these laws and regulations is the “most
problematic area” of policy implementation at the county and township
levels in China.311
GONG Ting contends that the functions of local governments as
state political agents and local economic principals have contributed to
widespread corruption in China. As state agents, local governments have
a great deal of administrative and economic discretion in implementing
government policies, including such additional economic powers as
“business licensing, resource distribution, administrative budgeting, local
taxation, and trade and investment in their own localities.”312 The local
officials’ enhanced power and discretion has increased the opportunities
for corruption in land transfers because of their “de facto power to decide
whether, how, to whom and at what price to lease land. Most local officials often succumb to bribery, while many of them also engage in aggressive ‘rent-seeking’ activities.”313 Land corruption involving ex310. Ibid., p. 4.
311. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
312. Ting Gong, “Corruption and Local Governance: The Double Identity of Chinese Local Government in Market Reform,” Pacific Review, 19 (1) (March 2006): 88-89.
313. Ibid., 90.
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changes between local officials and private interests has increased and as
many as 710,000 cases of illegal land deals were investigated from 1993
to 2003.314 A 2014 survey of 2,293 executives in China found that the
incidence of corruption was the highest at 41 percent in the real estate
and construction sector and 79 percent of them reported that local officials were the main beneficiaries of corruption because they “enjoy the
power and regulatory control to help or make life hell for businesses in
their domains.”315
The local governments’ second role as economic principals has encouraged local officials to expand their financial resources because their
performance is assessed by “local economic output, revenue growth and
improvement in living standards” rather than compliance with the central
government’s policies. Financial decentralization has forced local officials to use xiaojinku or “small coffers” for storing extra- and offbudgetary funds. Xiaojinku are also known as “private coffers” and do
not require the “strict budget compilation, examination, approval and execution” because “they remain outside normal financial revenue and expenditure.” These coffers are also used to “embezzle, withhold and hide
various forms of revenue and falsify costs and expenditure.” Often, their
funds are transferred from the account books and financial statements of
their organizations and deposited privately elsewhere.316 The money in
the private coffers are derived from “public funds, publicly or privately,
legally or illegally.”317
The excessive reliance on xiaojinku to keep secret funds by many
government agencies and SOEs have given rise to rampant organizational corruption in China. The amount kept in these “small coffers” has increased from 10 billion yuan in 1985 to 120 billion yuan in 1990.318 The
local officials’ increased reliance on extra- and off-budgetary revenues
has increased the opportunities for corruption because these revenues are
not subject to oversight. The off-budgetary funds kept in xiaojinku are
“notoriously associated with the corruption of local officials,” as these
funds are usually spent on bribery, bonuses and entertainment, including
314. Ibid., 90-91.
315. Chris Charney and Shehzad Qazi, “Corruption in China: What companies need to
know,” Charney Research White Paper No. 1 (January 2015): 2-3.
316. Sun Baohou, “Why private coffers are rampant,” in Wang Mengkui (Ed.), Good Governance in China – A Way towards Social Harmony: Case studies by China’s rising leaders
(London: Routledge, 2009), p. 4.
317. Ibid., p. 5.
318. Xiaobo Lu, “Bounty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China,” in Tak-Wing Ngo (Ed.), Contemporary Chinese Studies –
Economy and Society, Vol. 2, Regulation and Governance in the Hybrid Market (London:
Sage Publications, 2011), pp. 195-196.

72

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

the payment for lavish banquets, dancing, bowling, sauna bathing and
vacationing in sanatoriums.319
SUN Baohou, the Auditor-in-Chief of China’s National Audit Office, has observed that the “private coffers” are used for diverse purposes
by officials including extravagant eating and drinking, secret purposes,
currying favor with superiors, buying official positions, entertaining
guests and buying gifts, gambling, or keeping mistresses. Thus, these
private coffers are viewed as the “personal purses” of the leaders and officials and used by them for multiple purposes.320 He contends that corruption in China is a chronic disease which cannot be cured because the
“private coffers” in many public organizations provide “an endless financial source for corrupt officials.”321
5.

Guanxi and gift-giving

Cultural practices like guanxi and the tradition of gift-giving contribute to corruption in China by influencing individuals to give or receive bribes. Guanxi emphasizes the importance of “connections in order
to secure favors in personal relations” and refers to “interpersonal linkages with the implication of continued exchange of favors.”322 Apart
from promoting reciprocity in social relations, gift-giving also encourages bribery among civil servants, who accept gifts provided by businessmen wishing to cut red tape or to obtain licenses or permits improperly. Guanxixue, or the “exchange of gifts, favors, and banquets,” is
usually associated with official corruption in both official and popular
discourse in China.323
In China, “guanxi arose as a way to defuse and subvert the elaborate
regulations and restrictions that the state redistributive economy imposed
on everyday life.”324 HE Qiugang of the New China News Agency has
attributed the problem of corruption in the CCP to the criteria for promotion, which are based more on guanxi than merit. Accordingly, he recommended that the CCP should curb corruption by establishing a “scientific,” meritocratic cadre management system.325 His criticism is valid as
shown by a survey of 3,000 local cadres in 16 provinces, which found
319. Gong, “Corruption and Local Governance,” 96-97.
320. Sun, “Why private coffers are rampant,” p. 8.
321. Ibid., p. 10.
322. Yadong Luo, Guanxi and Business, 2nd edition (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2007), p. 2.
323. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships
in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 6 and 63.
324. Luo, Guanxi and Business, p. 27.
325. Quoted in Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, p. 80.
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that nepotism and corruption were widespread and meritocracy was “often absent when selecting cadres.”326 Based on their analysis of China’s
Central Committee members during the post-reform era, Victor Shih,
Christopher Adolph and LIU Mingxing found that factional ties with senior party leaders, educational qualifications, and provincial revenue collection were the most important factors in promotion rather than their
performance.327
The criteria for promoting Chinese officials and granting bonuses
are based on their age, educational level and length of service. Accordingly, in order to enhance their chances for promotion, many local officials “white wash” their personal records by changing “their ages, prolonging their working services, and enhancing their education degrees.”
Some officials have also deleted blemishes from their work records.
Since China lacks a system for preventing and punishing such practices,
faking records and deleting unwanted information are easy because “as
long as you bribe the staff in charge of managing profiles, you can easily
fix your record.”328
The gift-giving tradition makes it easy for Chinese officials to solicit bribes either directly or indirectly.329 Senior officials are usually induced to get involved in corruption progressively, beginning with “less
harmful banquets and seemingly innocent offering of gifts” to bribery
and embezzlement after guanxi is built.330 HUANG Zongliang, a Beijing
University professor, has attributed gift-giving to bribers attempting to
“buy over” officials in a subtle way to enable them to ask for favors in
the future. In his view, “festival gifts are simply bribes in disguise, although bribers may not ask for favors immediately.”331
Since guanxi is implicated in almost all major corruption scandals
in China, it provides “a fertile soil” for corruption to flourish and is “a
powerful tool wielded by corrupt officials to blackmail business for their
personal gains.”332 Gift-giving builds guanxi in the business world and
326. Dexter Roberts, “China’s Communist Party admits it has a big corruption problem,”
Bloomberg Businessweek, July 10, 2014.
327. Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph and Mingxing Liu, “Getting ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” American Political Science Review, 106 (1) (2012): 166-187.
328. Lu Chen, “Chinese officials lied about almost everything in personal records, except
gender,” Epoch Times, February 26, 2015.
329. Yuan Wang, Xin Sheng Zhang and Rob Goodfellow, China Business Culture: Strategies for Success (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2003), p. 171.
330. Peter Nan-Shong Lee, “Bureaucratic Corruption during the Deng Xiaoping Era,” Corruption and Reform, 5 (1) (1990): 35.
331. Quoted in De Mente, The Chinese Way in Business, p. 115.
332. Luo, Guanxi and Business, p. 228.
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the powerful combination of guanxi and gift-giving constitutes an important cause of corruption in China today. Furthermore, since political
factions in China are based on the guanxi networks of senior officials,
the existence of these networks undermines the anti-corruption campaign
because “cracking down on corrupt senior government officials requires
the Chinese government to destroy the guanxi networks that may shield
these officials from legal punishment.”333 Thus, Xi’s anti-graft campaign
“faces [a] core problem [because] graft is an important element in cementing the loyalty of officials.”334
The preceding analysis of the five causes of corruption in China reinforces the main thesis of this monograph, which is that Xi’s anticorruption campaign will only be effective if it addresses these causes
instead of treating only the symptoms of corruption. William Wan has
observed that “the license plate crackdown [on May 1, 2013] represents a
way for him [XI Jinping] to target the visible symptoms of corruption
without taking on its more tangled roots, such as military-related state
enterprises.”335 Since corruption in China is the result of the low salaries
of officials, red tape, low probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offenders, discretion of local officials without accountability, and
the cultural practices of guanxi and gift-giving, corruption cannot be
minimized unless measures are initiated by the CCP to deal with these
causes too.
D.

Corruption as a Weapon against Political Opponents

In 1988, Robert Klitgaard suggested that future research on corruption should focus on studying the abuse of anti-corruption powers because anti-corruption campaigns were used “to clean up political opponents rather than to clean up corruption.”336 Joseph Fewsmith has
observed that in China “charging one’s opponents (or their close followers) with corruption” has “become a weapon of choice for political maneuver.”337 During the past two decades, China’s political leaders have

333. Roderic Broadhurst and Peng Wang, “After the Bo Xilai trial: Does Corruption
threaten China’s future?” (unpublished revised working paper, December 17, 2013), p. 10.
334. Jonathan Fenby, Tiger Head, Snake Tails: China today, how it got there and why it
has to change (London: Simon & Schuster, 2013), p. 384.
335. William Wan, “China curbs use of coveted military license plates in latest anticorruption move,” Washington Post, April 1, 2013.
336. Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1988), p. 203.
337. Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 231.
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employed corruption as a weapon against their political enemies. According to HO Pin and HUANG Wenguang:
Leadership transitions historically have been times of political
intrigue and conspiracy, and during the past two decades a
common and effective way to eliminate a challenger or political opponent was to link a rival with a corruption scandal.
President JIANG Zemin employed the trick to consolidate his
power, as did his successor, President HU Jintao. In a oneparty state such as China, jockeying for influence is a raw reality of the political system. There is nowhere else to go, so all
fighting must be infighting.338
The regional DICs in China are very important tools used by the local leaders to eliminate their political foes. Moreover, the CCDI enforces
the law selectively and relies on an anti-corruption investigation as a tool
to protect the interests of some senior CCP leaders. The CCDI’s important function is “to filter out and if necessary remove any suggestion
of impropriety that might be harmful to the senior leadership, or attack
opponents, or protect certain privileged persons by warning and offering
a way out of a potential political scandal.”339 When a corruption scandal
is exposed, the CCP leaders control the damage by identifying “who will
take the fall” and taking action against them to appease the public.340
This means that only persons who lack connections or are not politically
significant are punished.
The four prominent examples are the purging of CHEN Xitong by
JIANG Zemin, CHEN Liangyu by HU Jintao, and BO Xilai and ZHOU
Yongkang by XI Jinping. These cases are discussed briefly below.
1.

CHEN Xitong

To illustrate the “politicization of graft-busting” in China, Willy
Lam indicates that the investigation of CHEN Xitong, Beijing’s Party
Secretary, in July 1995 was orchestrated by JIANG Zemin because of the
rivalry between his Shanghai Faction and Chen’s Beijing Faction.341
Since Chen’s Beijing Faction was supported by DENG Xiaoping, PENG
Zhen and WAN Li, Jiang was careful and only initiated investigations
into Chen’s corrupt activities after the suicide of Beijing’s vice-mayor,
WANG Baosen, on April 4, 1995, but before being interviewed by the
338. Pin Ho and Wenguang Huang, A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel: Murder, Money,
and an Epic Power Struggle in China (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), p. 4.
339. Ho and Huang, A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel, p. 143.
340. Hart, China’s Real Leadership Question, p. 8.
341. Wily Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin (Singapore: Prentice-Hall, 1999), p. 132.
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CCDI investigators. Since Chen was also the head of Beijing’s Construction Program Commission, he and Wang diverted US$4 million of public
funds towards the construction and furnishing of luxury villas “for private use in assignations with their mistresses.”342 Wang invested US$12
million of Beijing’s municipal government funds in the Wuxi Xinxing
Company in Jiangsu Province because it promised investors monthly returns of between five to ten percent. The company collapsed when its
president stopped paying dividends and did not return the invested capital. The investors complained to the authorities, which then investigated
the company’s activities and Wang’s investment.343
Since Chen was a Politburo member, the Central Committee approved the CCDI’s formal investigation of Chen on July 7 and removed
him from both committees in September 1995.344 A multi-departmental
team of elite agents from the police, Ministry of State Security, SPP,
MOS and CCDI was formed to investigate Chen’s case.345 Chen became
the highest ranking CCP member to be jailed for corruption when he was
sentenced to 16 years imprisonment for graft involving the misappropriation of 22 gifts worth 555,000 yuan and dereliction of duty on July 31,
1998.346 Chen’s sentence was lenient compared to more junior CCP cadres who were given life sentences or the death penalty for corruption
involving smaller amounts exceeding 100,000 yuan. However, Chen’s
imprisonment on corruption charges was a successful attempt by his political opponents to undermine his power. His incarceration protected
more than 170 corrupt senior CCP members from criminal punishment.347 Chen’s prosecution was delayed for more than two years because the CCP was afraid that he would “expose in public the identity of
other high-ranking corrupt officials” if he had to appear in court.348
Fewsmith viewed Chen’s ouster and investigation by Jiang as a reflection
of “old-style politics, as one powerful politician defeated another and in-

342. Manion, Corruption by Design, pp. 193-194.
343. Ibid., p. 194.
344. Ibid., pp. 194-196.
345. Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, p. 133.
346. “Web of deceit: Main characters in the Chen Xitong scandal,” Straits Times, August
10, 1998, p. 18.
347. Zou Keyuan, “Why China’s rampant corruption cannot be checked by laws alone,” in
Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (Eds.), Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party
in the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), p. 86.
348. Sonny S.H. Lo, “Public Maladministration and Bureaucratic Corruption,” in David
C.B. Teather and Herbert S. Yee (Eds.), China in Transition: Issues and Policies (Basingtoke:
Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 59.

HUNTING THE CORRUPT “TIGERS” AND “FLIES” IN CHINA

77

creased his hold on power.”349 This also enhanced Jiang’s reputation with
the public.350
2.

CHEN Liangyu

The second example was the sacking of CHEN Liangyu, Shanghai’s
party chief, on September 25, 2006 by President HU Jintao for his alleged role in the misuse of 3.2 billion yuan from Shanghai’s 10 billion
yuan pension fund. Chen was an ally of former president JIANG Zemin
and was “a political thorn in the side” for Hu and was “often mentioned
as a potential casualty of leadership battles.”351 Apart from showing that
he was more serious than his predecessor in combating graft, Hu was also “a past master at using the ‘anti-graft card’ as a potent weapon against
rival CCP cliques.” As Jiang had used fighting graft as a pretext to remove CHEN Xitong and LI Ruihuan, a Politburo member, it seemed that
Hu had taken “a leaf from Jiang’s book.”352
In July 2006, ZHU Junyi, Director of Shanghai’s Social Security
Bureau, was accused of receiving bribes and misusing 3 billion yuan
(US$400 million) in funds. Chen’s former secretary, QIN Yu, was arrested in August, and Chen himself was removed from office on September 24, 2006 for his involvement in the pension fund scandal. As it is extremely rare for PSC members to be prosecuted, even if there is evidence
of their corrupt activities, Joseph Kahn argues that HU Jintao approved
Chen’s arrest because he viewed Chen as “an obstacle to his political
control or his policy agenda.”353
Chen’s arrest “marked a significant diminution in the influence” of
the Shanghai Faction.354 The arrests of Chen and two members of the
CCP Political Bureau on corruption charges in September 2006, and the
removal from office of the mayors of Shenzhen and Chongqing in 2009,
indicate that “anti-corruption campaigns often have as much to do with
settling intra-party rivalries as they do with reasserting public probity.”355

349. Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 173.
350. Ibid., p. 173.
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Chen was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for bribery and abuse of
power on April 11, 2008 by the Tianjin No. 2 Intermediate People’s
Court.356
3.

BO Xilai

The third example of the CCP’s reliance on corruption as a political
weapon was the sacking and detention of BO Xilai, Chongqing’s party
chief, on March 15, 2012 by XI Jinping. Bo was removed on April 10,
2012 from his Politburo and Central Committee positions for “serious”
but unspecified violations of party discipline (meaning corruption).357
Garnault contends that the BO Xilai scandal has exposed “a world of
staggering brutality, corruption, hypocrisy, and fragility” and destroying
Bo gave Xi “a weapon with which he could taint Bo’s associates and accelerate the consolidation of his power.358
Similarly, Steve Tsang, Director of Nottingham University’s China
Policy Institute, describes the BO Xilai scandal as “a political rather than
a legal case.” Willy Lam emphasizes the fact that it is “easy to use the
law to attack your opponents.” Bo’s downfall as a victim of the factional
in-fighting within the CCP in the lead-up to the 18th Party Congress in
November 2012 reminded Lam of the “old-style backstabbing under
Mao Zedong.”359
Bo was expelled from the CCP on September 28, 2012 and handed
over to the SPP to face criminal charges of taking bribes, abuse of power,
having improper sexual relationships with many women, and violating
organizational and personnel discipline. On October 26, 2012, he lost his
immunity against legal prosecution when he was removed from his position as a delegate to the NPC. He was charged with bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power on July 23, 2013.360 Bo pleaded not guilty to
the three charges during his trial on August 22-26, 2013, but he was
found guilty on all the charges and sentenced to life imprisonment on

356. “Former Shanghai party chief gets 18-year term for bribery,” China View, April 11,
2008.
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September 22, 2013.361 His appeal against life imprisonment was rejected by a judge of the Shandong Higher Court on October 25, 2013.362
4.

ZHOU Yongkang

The most recent case of using corruption as a weapon against a political opponent was the investigation of ZHOU Yongkang in July 2014
and his subsequent expulsion from the CCP on December 5, 2014.363
Zhou was the Minister of Public Security from 2002-2007, a member of
the PSC, and secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee
of the CCP’s Central Committee from 2007-2012. When he retired from
his official positions in November 2012, the CCDI began investigating
him in July 2014.
The major reason for Zhou’s ouster was his close relationship with
and support for BO Xilai. WANG Lijun, vice-mayor and police chief of
Chongqing, was sacked by Bo on February 2, 2012, when he was investigated by the CCDI for corruption. Wang retaliated by sending a letter
by express mail to the CCDI accusing Bo and his wife of bribery and
transferring large amounts of money abroad.364 On February 6, 2012,
Wang sought political asylum in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu since he
feared for his life. Since he was not granted asylum by the U.S., Wang
left the U.S. Consulate on February 8 with the officials from the Ministry
of State Security, sent by Zhou, to escort him to Beijing.365 Wang stood
trial on charges of breaking the law for selfish ends, defection, abuse of
power, and bribery and was sentenced on September 22, 2012 to 15
years’ imprisonment.366
Wang’s attempted defection to the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu and
his revelations of the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood by
GU Kailai, Bo’s wife, provided ample justification for the CCP leaders
to remove Bo before the Party Congress. At its meeting on February 12,
2012, the PSC discussed Wang’s unsuccessful defection and his accusations against Bo. Eight of the nine PSC members at the meeting decided
to detain Bo for investigation, with the only dissenting vote cast by Zhou
because his son had received 4.2 billion yuan worth of government pro361. Kor Kian Beng, “Bo Xilai remains defiant as he gets life term,” Straits Times, September 23, 2013, p. A1.
362. Ho Ai Li, “Court rejects Bo Xilai’s appeal,” Straits Times, October 26, 2013, p. A12.
363. Chris Buckley, “China arrests ex-chief of domestic security in graft case,” New York
Times, December 5, 2014.
364. Ho and Huang, A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel, pp. 4 and 9.
365. Ibid., pp. 12-15 and 58-59.
366. Ibid., pp. 66-67 and “Wang Lijun sentenced to 15 years in prison,” Xinhua News,
September 24, 2012.
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jects from Bo. Zhou had also recommended Bo to replace him when he
retired from the PSC in November 2012.367 At the NPC meetings in
March 2012, Zhou was the only senior leader who interacted with Bo
and praised him for his achievements in developing Chongqing. However, Zhou was prevented from leaving China that week because the CCP
leaders had discovered that he and Bo had met five times in 2011 to conspire to topple the heir apparent, XI Jinping, in 2014.368 Zhou was
charged for leaking state secrets because he had warned Bo in early 2012
that he would be ousted.369
Box 1: US$16.05 Billion of Assets of Zhou Yongkang Confiscated by the
Procuratorates
The procuratorates in Beijing, Guandong, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu Province
and Shandong Province searched Zhou Yongkang’s residences in seven different provinces and confiscated the following assets:
1. 326 residences in Beijing, Shenyang, Dalian, Jinan, Yantai,
Chengdu, Nanjing, Wuxi, Suzhou, Shanghai, Guangzhou and
Shenzhen with a combined worth of up to 1.76 billion yuan
(US$282.55 million).
2. Cash in these currencies: 152.7 million yuan (US$24.5 million),
US$275 million, 662 thousand euro, 10,000 British pounds, and
55,000 Swiss francs.
3. 42,850 grams of gold, silver, and gold coins.
4. 62 cars including military jeeps and a medium-sized tourist bus.
5. 55 paintings by famous painters with a total market value of up to
8 million to 1 billion yuan (US$128.4 million to US$160.5 million).
6. Five each of three different types of domestically manufactured
guns, three each of guns from Germany, Russia, England and
Belgium, and up to 11,000 bullets.
7. 647 accounts and 117 foreign currency accounts belonging to
Zhou and his relatives in 12 financial institutions and 133 different branches were frozen; and 930 other accounts under pseudonyms, fake names, and company names had 37.7336 billion yuan.
The total amount in these accounts is $6.06 billion.
8. Petroleum, aviation, wine, and financial securities with a total
market value of 51.3 billion yuan (US$8.24 billion), as well as
foreign securities and bonds worth up to 170 million yuan
(US$27.29 million) were also seized.
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Based on this list, the assets confiscated from ZHOU Yongkang amounted to
over 100 billion yuan or US$16.05 billion in value.
Source: TANG Di, “Hong Kong magazine reveals crimes and wealth of China’s
former security czar,” Epoch Times, December 26, 2014.

Box 1 provides details of the US$16.05 billion worth of assets confiscated by the procuratorates from searching his residences in seven
provinces in China after his investigation by the CCDI in July 2014.
While the revelation of Zhou’s massive assets confirms his involvement
in many corruption scandals, it should be emphasized that he was ousted
by the CCP leaders not only because of his corruption scandals but more
importantly for his conspiracy with Bo to challenge Xi’s leadership.
VII. CONCLUSION: BUSINESS AS USUAL WHEN THE
CAMPAIGN ENDS
A.

No-Win Situation for the CCP
The fight against corruption is a long term task and still a serious
task . . . I have never said one hundred coffins, one for myself. I know of
this widespread rumor. But one hundred coffins are not enough for all
the corrupt officials!
Zhu Rongji, 2002370
Corruption among the elite [in China] is rampant . . . [and] is a time
bomb ticking at the regime’s clay feet.
David M. Lampton, 2014371

The CCP is caught in the horns of a dilemma: it is aware that corruption is a serious problem in China which it has to resolve to ensure its
long term survival and legitimacy. The first quotation by XI Jinping cited
at the beginning of this monograph identifies corruption as a threat to the
CCP’s survival if it is not curbed. However, former premier ZHU
Rongji’s observation above on the inadequacy of 100 coffins for corrupt
officials reflects how widespread corruption is among Chinese officials
and David Lampton’s 2014 quotation captures accurately the urgency of
the corruption problem in China and explains why it can no longer be ignored by the CCP leaders.
370. Quoted in David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money,
and Minds (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 237-238.
371. Donald M. Lampton, Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi
Jinping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), p. 227.
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The major casualty of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is the CCP’s reputation whose image is constantly “tarnished with each case lodged against
a high-profile official.”372 In July 2009, a popular anonymous blog on the
Internet described corrupt officials in China pejoratively as “the new
black-collar class” because they concealed their wrongdoing in secrecy
thusly:
They drive top-brand cars. They go to exclusive bars. They
sleep on the softest beds in the best hotels. . . . They play golf,
travel at the public expense, and enjoy a life of luxury. They
are the newly arrived ‘black-collar class.’ Their cars are black.
Their income is hidden. Their life is hidden. Their work is hidden. Everything about them is hidden, like a man wearing
black, standing in the black of night.373
The recent exposure of the corruption scandals involving BO Xilai
and ZHOU Yongkang has eroded public confidence in the CCP.374 Consequently, when corruption scandals emerge, the CCP leaders “go to
great lengths today to convince Chinese citizens that corruption scandals
are isolated incidents caused by a few bad eggs rather than a systemic
problem with single-party rule.”375 However, a recent study by BAI
Ruoyon has concluded that “the discrepancy between the CCP’s highly
publicized anti-corruption struggles and the seemingly unstoppable escalation of corruption has engendered pessimism and cynicism among the
general population.”376
The CCP finds itself between a rock and a hard place: “if the Party
does not get rid of corruption, it will lose the trust of the people, but if it
does, it will have no members.”377 At the same time, however, the CCP
leaders also know that the Party will not survive if it succeeds in minimizing corruption by introducing such political reforms as the creation of
an independent ACA and judiciary. Can the CCP curb corruption effectively without causing its own demise? The short answer is: No.
The overthrow of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 “shook the CCP
to its core” and led to extensive analyses of the lessons which China
372. Jaime A. FlorCruz, “China corruption charges no longer shock,” CNN.com, July 31,
2014.
373. Quoted in Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist
Rulers, rev. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2012), pp. 140-141.
374. Jamil Anderlini, “China corruption trials risk erosion of party legitimacy,” Financial
Times, September 25, 2013.
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could learn during the next 13 years.378 These lessons were published in
the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Enhancing the Party’s
Ruling Capacity, which was adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the
16th Congress of the CCP in September 2004. This important document
identified the 52 economic, political and coercive, social and cultural,
and international factors responsible for the Soviet Union’s collapse.379
Among the 17 political and coercive factors, corruption was surprisingly not mentioned explicitly but only indirectly as the result of “poorly
developed mechanisms to police party members for breach of discipline.”380 Few analysts have highlighted the sensitive problems of corruption and party privileges for obvious reasons. However, HUANG
Weiding identified corruption as an important cause of the Soviet Union’s collapse, which was overlooked by the CCP. To the CCP “the
death of the CPSU was not caused by anti-communist forces, but rather
by corrupted members within the Party.”381 Huang warned that corruption could spread like a cancer within the CCP and threaten its survival
by weakening its leadership and forming special interests within the party and state apparatus. Since corruption aggravates inequality and other
social problems, and causes bureaucratic inefficiency and economic losses, he believes that corruption within the CCP is the critical issue threatening its survival because if it is not managed effectively, “the end of the
party and state is likely.”382
In 1993, JIANG Changbin attributed corruption in the Soviet Union
to the “progressive atrophy of the CPSU’s vaunted nomenklatura personnel system.” In similar vein, HE Qiugang identified these six kinds of
special personal privileges enjoyed by CPSU members: special housing,
special supplies, special education, special benefits for family members
and relatives, special guards, and special expense accounts. Money politics was rampant in the CPSU, and cronyism and nepotism were practised by its leaders.383 To curb corruption within the CCP, he recommended that regulations should be introduced to enhance the
transparency of the personal assets of its leaders. The CCP’s reliance on
guanxi instead of merit to promote its members has also contributed to

378. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, pp. 57 and 60.
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the development of factions and its “unscientific” process of leadership
succession.384
As mentioned in Section II above, the CCP leaders are aware that
corruption was responsible for the decline of the various dynasties and
the KMT’s defeat in 1949. Hence, the important role played by corruption in contributing to the Soviet Union’s collapse has reminded the CCP
leaders that what had happened in China in the past and in the former
Soviet Union, can also occur in China today as corruption can lead to the
CCP’s downfall in the future too if the problem is not resolved.
B.

Addressing the Causes of Corruption

In view of the CCP’s entrenched position in China’s political system, it is unrealistic to expect the CCP leaders to initiate fundamental political reforms to undermine their power for the foreseeable future. In his
May 2006 interview with a Chinese journalist, Mikhail Gorbachev
warned his Chinese friends not to practice democratization as “it will not
end well” because “if the party loses control over society and reform,
there will be chaos, and that is very dangerous. Before we were prepared,
we allowed Soviet society to greatly liberalize.”385 Learning from the
Soviet Union’s collapse and reinforced by Gorbachev’s warning, it is unlikely that Xi and his colleagues will introduce the necessary political reforms to enhance the ACAs’ effectiveness in minimizing corruption in
China. Bearing in mind this caveat, can anything be done by the CCP to
curb corruption in China?
Even though Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is “both qualitatively
and quantitatively more intense”386 than previous campaigns, it is unlikely to be effective for three reasons. The most important reason why Xi’s
campaign is unlikely to succeed is because it has dealt only with the
symptoms of corruption but not its causes. Among the five causes of corruption in China discussed in Section VI.C above, the campaign has only
addressed the cultural practices of guanxi and gift-giving by curbing official extravagance on the three public expenses – cars, banquets, and
overseas trips. This limitation of Xi’s anti-graft campaign was admitted
by WANG Qishan, the CCDI’s secretary, in October 2014 when he indicated that “it’s necessary to address the symptoms of corruption before

384. Ibid., p. 80.
385. Quoted in ibid., pp. 70-71.
386. Merridan Varrall, “Corruption in China: The Cultural Divide,” The Interpreter, September 23, 2014.
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treating its root causes.”387 However, after two and a quarter years, the
campaign is still dealing with the symptoms of corruption without addressing the other four causes.
Rukshana Nanayakkara, Transparency International’s Asia-Pacific
Regional Outreach Manager, has appropriately compared China’s method of high-profile arrests and asset seizures to stripping a tree of leaves
while leaving its roots and trunk untouched. He contends that “you cannot fight corruption by adopting a prosecutorial approach” because “if
you want to kill a tree, you have to take it out from the roots.” In other
words, corruption will prevail unless its fundamental causes are addressed.388
The second limitation of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is the selective
enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the ACAs in China. One of
the four reasons responsible for the effectiveness of Singapore’s CPIB in
curbing corruption is the impartial enforcement of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This means that anyone found guilty of corruption in Singapore is punished, regardless of the offender’s position, status, or political
affiliation.389 By contrast, the ACAs in China do not enforce the anticorruption laws impartially for two reasons.
First, as explained in Section IV.E above, the CCP enforces the anti-corruption laws in China selectively because it protects its corrupt
members by handing them over to the CCDI to discipline them internally
within the Party instead of transferring them to the SPP for criminal investigation and prosecution. However, and this is the second reason, not
all the corrupt officials are protected by the CCP, especially those who
are viewed to be political opponents by the CCP leaders. XUECUN Murong contends that Xi’s crackdown on corruption is selective and is
“more of a Stalinist purge than a genuine attempt to clean up the government” because “investigations are run by K.G.B.-type cadres, not the
regular judicial system.” More importantly, “the purge has mainly targeted specific party factions,” but those groups in Fujian and Zheijiang
Provinces that support and are loyal to Xi appear untouched. When this
question: “Why have no ‘big tigers’ been found in Fujian and Zhejiang?”
was posted on the Internet, it was removed almost immediately.390

387. Quoted in Sun Xiaobo, “Institutionalizing anti-corruption a vital task,” Global Times,
October 19, 2014.
388. Quoted in Nathan Vanderklippe, “Despite high-profile crackdown, China falls in
global corruption ranks,” The Globe and Mail, December 2, 2014.
389. Jon S.T. Quah, “Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau: Four Suggestions for Enhancing its Effectiveness,” Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (1) (January 2015): 79-80.
390. Murong Xuecun, “Xi’s Selective Punishment,” New York Times, January 16, 2015.
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Similarly, Broadhurst and Wang noted in December 2013 that “the
‘tigers’ being investigated or prosecuted thus far are also Xi’s political
rivals, while other ‘tigers’ are so far untouched.” Since a “partial and incomplete anti-corruption drive” may weaken the CCP’s leadership and
legitimacy, they recommended that “in order to win public support, it is
important that Xi’s anti-corruption drive is universal and even those from
his own ‘string’ or guanxi network cannot escape punishment.”391
One month after the publication of Xuecun’s criticism that Xi’s anti-graft campaign had not investigated any “tiger” from Fujian and Zheijiang Provinces, the CCDI announced on February 17, 2015 that SI Xinliang, the Vice-President of the Zheijiang Provincial People’s Political
Consultative Conference, became the first “tiger” hunted in Zheijiang
Province.392 On March 2, 2015, the PLA Daily reported that Major General GUO Zhenggang, Deputy Political Commissar of the Zheijiang Provincial Military Command, was being investigated for corruption in February.393 In March 2015, XU Gang, Deputy Governor of Fujian
Province, became the first “tiger” from Fujian Province to be investigated for corruption.394 The investigation of these three “tigers” from Fujian
and Zheijiang Provinces shows that the “tigers” in these two provinces
are not immune from being investigated for corruption. However, since
the number of these “tigers” is still very small – two among the 71 civilian “tigers” (or 2.8 percent) and one among the 30 military “tigers” (or
3.3 percent) – the number of “tigers” being hunted in both provinces
should be increased substantially to dispel the public perception and criticism that the corrupt “tigers” in Fujian and Zheijiang Provinces are immune from investigation by the CCDI.
Thus, contrary to the official rhetoric that the anti-corruption laws
are enforced impartially in China, the acid test of the impartiality of Xi’s
anti-corruption campaign is the investigation and prosecution of all “tigers” and “flies,” regardless of their political affiliation or membership
of factions within the CCP. However, it might be difficult for Xi to be
impartial because in China “if an anti-graft campaign targets a campaign
leader’s allies, this would damage the campaign leader’s reputation and
make him or her lose face within the guanxi network.”395 The “litmus

391. Broadhurst and Wang, “After the Bo Xilai trial,” p. 12.
392. Mason Coltrane, “Another ‘big tiger’ caught in President Xi Jinping’s mission against
corruption in China,” Yibada, February 18, 2015.
393. Catherine Wong Tsoi-lai, “Military probes 14 senior PLA officers for graft,” Global
Times, March 3, 2015.
394. Laura Zhou and Minnie Chan, “China’s anti-graft drive spreads to President Xi
Jinping’s Fujian power base,” South China Morning Post, March 21, 2015.
395. Broadhurst and Wang, “After the Bo Xilai trial,” p. 10.
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test” for Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is whether it “encompasses the
families of top leaders” including Xi’s relatives and those of former
Premier WEN Jiabao, whose wealth was revealed in 2012 respectively
by Bloomberg and the New York Times.396
The third limitation of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which is related to the previous weakness, is the reliance of the CCP leaders on corruption as a weapon against their political opponents, as shown in the
persecution of CHEN Xitong, CHEN Liangyu, BO Xilai and ZHOU
Yongkang from 1995 to 2014. As shown above, these four party leaders
were prosecuted not only for their corruption offenses, but more importantly because they posed a threat to the consolidation of power of
Presidents JIANG Zemin, HU Jintao and XI Jinping, respectively. China
is not unique in relying on corruption as the weapon of choice against
political enemies because other Asian countries use this method too.397
However, as long as the political leaders continue to use corruption as a
weapon against their opponents, China will not be able to combat corruption effectively. Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy is reflected
in its rejection of using corruption as a weapon against political opponents of the government. There, those who are found guilty of corruption
offenses are punished according to the law, regardless of their background or political affiliation.398
In sum, XI Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is ineffective for
three reasons: it focuses on the symptoms of corruption instead of tackling its causes; the anti-corruption laws are enforced selectively; and corruption is the weapon of choice employed against the CCP’s political
opponents. Thus, if President Xi wishes to enhance the effectiveness of
his anti-corruption campaign, he has to initiate measures to address the
first four causes of corruption in China, enforce the anti-corruption laws
impartially and not selectively, and avoid using corruption as a weapon
against his political opponents.

396. Fenby, Tiger Head, Snake Tails, p. 384; Michael Forsythe, Shai Oster, Natasha Khan
and Dune Lawrence, “Xi Jinping millionaire relations reveal fortunes of elite,” BloombergBusiness, June 29, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-29/xijinping-millionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite (accessed 20 February 2015), and David
Barboza, “Billions amassed in the shadows by the family of China’s premier,” New York
Times, October 26, 2012, available at http://www.pulitzer.org/files/2013/internationalreporting/princelings10-26.pdf (accessed 20 February 2015).
397. The “tendency to use corruption charges to settle political scores is widespread” in
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. See Dini Djalal, “Southeast Asia,” in Robin
Hodess (Ed.), Global Corruption Report 2001 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2001), pp.
32-33.
398. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, pp. 230-232.
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The five causes of corruption in China are analyzed in Section VI.C
above. During its first two and a quarter years, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has so far only taken action to minimize the negative effects of
guanxi and gift-giving by introducing the “Eight Directives” and “Six Injunctions” to curb official extravagance, while the other four causes have
been ignored by the campaign.
Public sector salaries in China remain low even after the six salary
increases from July 1997 to July 2006.399 According to Richard McGregor, “the paltry official pay rates add an extra incentive for graft” since
“the formal cash salaries of even senior officials are miserable and invariably padded by illicit income.”400 The latest increase in public sector
salaries announced on January 20, 2015 reveals that XI Jinping’s monthly salary has risen by 62 percent from 7,020 yuan (US$1,124) to 11,385
yuan (US$1,823). At the other extreme, the monthly salary of the most
junior civil servant has increased to 1,320 yuan (US$211).401 President
Xi’s annual salary of US$21,876 pales in comparison to U.S. President
Obama’s annual salary of US$400,000 and Singapore Prime Minister
LEE Hsien Loong’s annual salary of S$2.2 million (US$1.76 million).402
In view of the low public sector salaries in China, a necessary but
insufficient condition for curbing corruption is to increase these salaries
to minimize the temptation for public officials to succumb to corruption
and to discourage them from leaving for better paid jobs in the private
sector. It is unrealistic to expect Chinese public officials to remain honest
if they are paid low salaries, which are inadequate for meeting their daily
needs. Accordingly, they should be paid decent salaries instead of “starvation wages” to insulate them from bribery and patronage.
However, since raising salaries is expensive, China should increase
public sector wages more frequently as the most recent adjustment occurred more than eight years after the July 2006 pay increase. Furthermore, it should be noted that raising salaries minimizes petty corruption
by reducing the incentive for corruption among junior officials but does
not eliminate grand corruption among senior bureaucrats and politicians.
399. For details of these pay increases, see Alfred M. Wu, Governing Civil Service Pay in
China (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2014), p. 161.
400. McGregor, The Party, p. 140.
401. “Xi, Politburo members receive 62% pay rise,” Straits Times, January 21, 2015, p.
A12.
402. The committee appointed by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong after the May 2011
general election in Singapore to review the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants recommended, inter alia, the reduction of the Prime Minister’s annual salary by 28 percent from
S$3,072,200 in 2010 to S$2.2 million. See White Paper on Salaries for a Capable and Committed Government, Command 1 of 2012 (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 10 January
2012), p. 7.
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Finally, increasing salaries alone is ineffective in curbing corruption in
China if the government lacks the political will to address the other causes of corruption.
In March 2013, ZHANG Tongxi, the Board Chairman of Datong
Coal Group in Shanxi, complained to the NPC delegates in Beijing that
he had to contact 33 government departments and submit 147 documents
and 205 permits to open a new coal company.403 During the same
month, Premier LI Keqiang promised to reduce at least a third of the
1,700 items requiring central government approval within the next five
years.404 However, despite Li’s promise, red tape persists in China as
confirmed by the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015. According to the
World Bank, China requires 11 procedures and 31.4 days to start a business and 22 procedures and 244.3 days to obtain a license405 (see Table
12). China should enhance its efforts to minimize red tape by relying on
e-governance in order to increase transparency and reduce corruption.
As local officials in China regard their position as “a license to
steal,”406 their discretion can be minimized by making them more accountable for their actions. As mentioned above, the CCDI has despatched 10 inspection teams across China in 2013 to investigate corruption complaints in government agencies, public organizations and
provinces. A more cost-effective measure would be to establish an inspectorate in every capital city in the 22 provinces, four municipalities
and five autonomous regions in China to ensure that local officials implement the laws and regulations enacted by the central government.
These officials are unlikely to implement these laws and regulations unless they are punished for non-compliance.
However, the ACAs in China cannot implement the anti-corruption
laws impartially unless the CCP relinquishes the protection of corrupt
party members from investigation and criminal prosecution by the SPP
and its reliance on corruption as a weapon against its political opponents.
Since these two limitations on the ACAs’ effectiveness are unlikely to be
removed by the CCP, it is unrealistic to expect any change in the selective implementation of the anti-corruption laws in the foreseeable future.
Writing in 2003, ZOU Keyuan lamented that “once the anticorruption campaign ends, new corrupt activities will resurface, as

403. “Why China’s corruption is so hard to clean up,” Asia Sentinel, March 20, 2013.
404. Esther Teo, “China slowly unwinds red tape: Streamlining bureaucratic process part
of reforms to spur business,” Straits Times, October 21, 2013, p. A8.
405. World Bank, Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2014), p. 178.
406. Magnier, “Bribery and graft taint every facet of life in China.”
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shown in every previous anti-corruption campaign.”407 He has also astutely noted that “realistically, it is impossible for China to completely
eliminate corruption.” Consequently, China can only curb an increase
corruption because “after 20 years of reform, corruption has become
even more severe.”408 Six years later, Roderick MacFarquhar was also
pessimistic in his assessment: “despite repeated official campaigns, regulations, and exhortations, corruption on a colossal scale has infected all
levels of state and society.” He concluded that the status quo in China
would remain the same because “so long as local leaders deliver taxes,
promote development, and maintain law and order, the central leaders
seem prepared to look the other way.”409
Following Zou and MacFarquhar, my assessment of Xi’s anticorruption campaign is equally pessimistic because it fails to address the
fundamental causes of corruption in China. Unlike the many previous anti-corruption campaigns initiated by the CCP during 1951 to 2011, Xi’s
campaign has lasted for more than two years and has curbed official extravagance and made corrupt officials more cautious for fear of being
caught. However, by failing to rectify the root causes of corruption, Xi’s
campaign “acts like a dose of ‘antibiotics’ that maintains short-term solidarity but also leads to resistant strains of bacteria.”410
The same argument is convincingly made by MENG Qingli, who
describes corruption in China as “the flooding water from an overflowing
tub on the floor in a room.” She contends that relying on the criminal justice system to detect, arrest, investigate, prosecute and convict offenders
in China is “merely mopping up the over-flowing water” without tackling the root causes of corruption.411 She concludes that “an indispensable way to stop corruption, like stopping the water flow, is to attack the
source” by turning off the faucet. Indeed, she believes that “until the etiology of the crimes is addressed, corruption will continue.”412
In other words, the change in the corrupt officials’ behavior is only
temporary as they will revert to their wayward ways again after the campaign or if they identify weaknesses or loopholes in the implementation
of the campaign. It is unrealistic and unlikely for Xi’s anti-corruption
campaign to make a significant impact in minimizing the systemic cor407. Zou, “Why China’s rampant corruption cannot be checked by laws alone,” p. 84.
408. Ibid., p. 84.
409. Roderick MacFarquhar, “Keynote Address: The People’s Republic of China at Sixty,”
in William C. Kirby (Ed.), The People’s Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), p. 13.
410. Broadhurst and Wang, “After the Bo Xilai trial,” p. 17.
411. Meng, Corruption in Transitional China, p. 167.
412. Ibid., p. 167.
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ruption in China so long as the campaign focuses on the symptoms instead rather than the causes of corruption. Furthermore, corrupt party
members are unlikely to change their ways if they are only disciplined
internally by the CCDI for their corrupt offenses and if they do not oppose their leadership. As Kerry Brown has observed astutely: “The bottom line remains the same: to be a leader in China means to be available
to temptation and demands that are most of the time irresistible, and
there is little sign that anything is being done to address that question.”413
While Xi’s anti-graft campaign has received public support, its
weakness is that, unlike anti-corruption efforts in Singapore and Hong
Kong, it does not rely on public support. An important reason for the
success of Singapore and Hong Kong in combating corruption is the tremendous public support for the CPIB and the ICAC, respectively. The
2002 Public Perceptions Survey of the CPIB’s performance found that 70
percent of the respondents believed that the CPIB was impartial in its investigations, 65 percent of them said that the CPIB had not abused its investigation powers, and 66 percent of them thought that the CPIB would
keep the corruption reports received confidential.414 Similarly, the
ICAC’s annual surveys from 2000 to 2009 confirmed that an average of
98.9 percent of the respondents said that the ICAC deserved to be supported, an average of 71.9 percent of the respondents trusted the ICAC
and would reveal their identity when reporting to it, and an average of 75
percent of the respondents believed that the ICAC was an impartial law
enforcement agency.415
Since there are no surveys on the public perceptions of the ACAs in
China, it is not possible to ascertain the extent of public support for these
agencies. The ACAs in China rely on these sources of information: citizen reports, inspections, audits, and media exposure. CAI Yongshun indicates that citizen reports or tips in “the forms of letters, visits, online
reports, e-mails, and phone calls” are the most important source of information and accounted for 60 percent to 80 percent of the corruption
cases investigated by the legal department.416 However, only a small proportion of the tips received by the ACAs result in pursuable cases. The
DICs and supervision bureaus investigated only 7.3 percent of the 13.9
million reports received by them from 1996 to 2008.417 The anonymous
tips on corruption provided by citizens are not useful as they are often
413. Kerry Brown, “Shanghai, and the Fall of Chen Liangyu: Corruption, Politics or
Both?” Chatham House Briefings, No. 1 (October 2006): 5.
414. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, p. 228.
415. Ibid., p. 262.
416. Cai, State and Agents in China, p. 106.
417. Ibid., p. 108, Table 5.2.
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inaccurate, speculative, vague, or based on distorted information.418
Some tips are not pursued for political reasons because the timing is inappropriate or other factors prevent the investigation of the reported
problems.419 Cai contends that the selective use of tips by the ACAs in
China casts doubt on their credibility in combating corruption.420
The Internet has become an important site for exposing corruption
scandals in China. BAI Ruoyun found out that more than 70 scandals involving local party and state officials were revealed on the Internet from
2008-2013.421 These scandals were characterized by these four features:
(1) citizens were responsible for exposing these scandals by sustaining
and amplifying them and forcing the CCDI to take action; (2) focus on
“sexual misdemeanours of officials involved in scandals [which] were
exposed as a ‘by-product’ of investigation”; (3) political scandals involving officials were exposed by the media for making inappropriate remarks, “ill-calculated facial expressions, expensive wristwatches that
they wear, and boorish manners that they put on” which were captured
by professional, amateur, or surveillance cameras and circulated on the
Internet; and (4) political scandals became “highly colorful and entertaining events” through the wide circulation on the Internet of “sex tapes,
lewd photos, diaries filled with details of bribery, power brokering, and
sexual adventures, pictures of luxurious accessories, copies of itemized
receipts detailing overseas travel costs or expensive purchases.”422
However, the media’s role in investigating corruption cases in China is limited because it “cannot confront tigers that are still alive” and
can only attack the carcasses of dead tigers. This means that the media
only provides extensive details on the scandals after the arrest of the corrupt tigers.423 To prevent the political damage from corruption scandals
involving their members from spreading, CCP leaders “decide how the
scandal will be presented and how it ends” and “all media outlets must
present that version of the facts.”424 As China’s major news outlets are
also state-owned, foreign journalists have assumed the responsibility for
exposing many corruption scandals in China.425 As mentioned above, the

418. Ibid., p. 109.
419. Ibid., p. 113.
420. Ibid., p. 118.
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wealth of the relatives of President XI Jinping and former Premier WEN
Jiabao was revealed by Bloomberg in June 2012 and the New York Times
in October 2012 respectively.426
Thus, instead of relying on public support and the media, the CCDI
relies on dispatching inspection teams throughout China to uncover corruption scandals. However, Leslie Holmes contends that Xi’s anticorruption campaign would be more effective “if it were inclusive—not
merely top down, but also unambiguously bottom-up.”427
At the 5th plenary session of the 18th CCP CCDI in Beijing on January 13, 2015, Xi declared that the fight against corruption was not over
because there were still challenges ahead so the battle was not won
yet.428 During the same meeting, he urged the CCDI officials to adopt a
zero-tolerance approach against corruption and reiterated his commitment to the anti-corruption campaign thus:
Our determination to use strong remedies to cure [the] illness
[of corruption] will not change. Our courage to rid our bones
of poison will not diminish. We will also continue to hold the
sharp sword of counter-corruption high.429
However, regardless of how long Xi sustains the anti-corruption
campaign, the result will be the same. Corruption will persist so long as
the campaign is enforced selectively and targets only those corrupt CCP
members opposed to his leadership without addressing the factors responsible for the systemic corruption in China. While every country has
corruption, “China’s was approaching a level of its own” because “for
those at the top, the scale of temptation had reached a level unlike anything ever encountered in the West.”430 As the attractive rewards of public office in China significantly outweigh the probability of being caught
and punished by Xi’s anti-graft campaign, the corrupt “tigers” and “flies”
will not change their stripes or mend their ways. They are simply lying
low to avoid being caught and will revert to type when the campaign
ends.
By describing Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as “a fast, low-risk
way to ease anxiety and earn goodwill among the Chinese people,” LI
Junheng contends that its emphasis on “targeting the surface” reflects “a

426. See footnote 396 above.
427. Leslie Holmes, “Combating Corruption in China: The Role of the State and Other
Agencies in Comparative Perspective,” Economic and Political Studies, 3 (1) (January 2015):
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lack of political will and power to fundamentally challenge the root
cause of corruption: a system lacking checks and balances, which is not
likely to change as it is the safeguard of the very interest of the Party.”
Consequently, she concludes that “the most realistic scenario for this
pseudo house cleaning is that, far from being expelled by the CCP’s
moral superpowers, corruption will be simply forced underground.”431
In short, corruption in China will persist as long as the rewards of
corruption exceed the probability of being caught and punished for the
corrupt “tigers” and “flies.” As new millionaires are minted every year in
China, “the temptation to leverage official positions to make money is
irresistible” and “many people seek administrative positions precisely
because they can monetize them.”432 In its editorial on the BO Xilai
scandal, Caixin magazine observed that Bo’s downfall confirmed the
“need to restrict government power” because “at this stage of its development, China offers too many temptations, and the collusion of money
and power is commonplace.”433 Box 1 above provides the graphic details
of the US$16.05 billion in assets which ZHOU Yongkang had accumulated illegally during his 29 years in public office (1983-2012).434 While
the anti-corruption system, which permits senior officials the right to
“supervise themselves,” remains the same, the size of bribes has increased exponentially into millions of dollars, even for junior officials.435
Table 14: Governance Indicators for China, 1996-2013
Indicator
Voice and Accountability
Political Stability and Absence
of Violence/Terrorism
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality

1996
12.02
41.35

2013
5.21
27.01

Difference
- 6.81
- 14.34

46.83
47.55

54.07
42.58

+ 7.24
- 4.97

431. Junheng Li, “Does China’s anti-corruption campaign spell the end of the mistress
economy?” Forbes, February 8, 2013.
432. McGregor, The Party, p. 140.
433. Quoted in Nicholas Kristof, “A body, a scandal and China,” New York Times, April
22, 2012, p. SR11.
434. Zhou Yongkang joined the CCP in 1964 and served as Mayor of Panjin city, Liaoning
Province (1983-1985); Vice-Minister of Petroleum Industry (1985-1988); Party Secretary of
Dongying, Shandong Province (1988-1996); General Manager, China National Petroleum
Corporation (1996-1998); Minister of Land and Resources (1998-1999); Secretary of Sichuan
Provincial Party Committee (1999-2002); Member of CCP Politburo and Minister of Public
Security (2002-2007); and Member of Politburo Standing Committee (2007-2012). See Chen,
“The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” p. 17, Appendix 1, “Brief Biography of Zhou Yongkang.”
435. McGregor, The Party, p. 139.
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Rule of Law
36.36
39.81
+ 3.45
Control of Corruption
43.90
46.89
+ 2.99
Total percentile rank
228.01
215.57
- 12.44
Source: Compiled from World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013” available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (accessed 11 March
2015).

Table 14 shows that China’s level of governance according to the
World Bank’s six indicators has declined from a total percentile rank of
228.01 in 1996 to 215.57 in 2013. Political stability has decreased by
14.34 percentile rank during the same period, followed by 6.81 percentile
rank for voice and accountability, and 4.97 percentile rank for regulatory
quality. On the other hand, government effectiveness has risen by 7.24
percentile rank, rule of law improved by 3.45 percentile rank, and control
of corruption rose by 2.99 percentile rank. Since China’s level of governance is unlikely to improve during the foreseeable future, the prospects for implementing the required political and economic reforms for
minimizing corruption are improbable.
In the final analysis, the widespread corruption in China can only be
minimized if the political leaders have the courage and political will to
initiate the necessary political and economic reforms to address its root
causes. The three “systemic flaws” of China’s political system, according
to Shambaugh, are the CCP’s policing itself through the CCDI, its refusal to allow other institutions or the media to expose corruption, and
the judiciary’s lack of independence. Thus, “unless and until the CCP
recognizes and addresses these three systemic flaws, corruption will continue to flourish in China.”436 However, such reforms will be difficult to
implement because corruption is “part of the system’s DNA”437 and cannot be eradicated without destroying the system. Consequently, corruption in China will “continue to breed like mosquitos in a swamp” 438 regardless of the duration of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.
In 2008, Shambaugh cautiously indicated that it was difficult to
predict whether the CCP could survive because of the multitude of variables and the complexity of China’s political system.439 However, he has
boldly predicted recently that “the endgame of Chinese communist rule
436. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, p. 166.
437. Will Hutton, The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (London: Little Brown, 2006), p. 129.
438. David Shambaugh, “Assessing China’s New Leadership one year on,” Paper presented at the Conference on “Cross-Strait Developments in 2013: New Trends and Prospects” organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC, October 3-4,
2013, p. 6.
439. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, p. 177.
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has now begun” because of the “five telling indications of the regime’s
vulnerability and the party’s systemic weaknesses.” One of these “five
increasingly evident cracks in the regime’s control” is the systemic corruption, which “riddles the party-state and the military” and also “pervades Chinese society as a whole.” Even though Xi’s anti-corruption
campaign is “more sustained and severe” than previous efforts, Shambaugh concludes that it cannot eliminate the problem of corruption which
is “stubbornly rooted in the single-party system, patron-client networks,
an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled media and
the absence of the rule of law.”440
Let me end my analysis with this prediction: even if President Xi
continues his anti-corruption campaign until the end of his ten-year term
of office in November 2022, the corrupt “tigers” and “flies” will resume
business as usual the next day as though the campaign has not occurred
at all simply because the incentives and opportunities for corruption persist in China and will prove to be irresistible to them once again. Indeed,
without tackling the underlying causes of corruption, no anti-corruption
campaign, no matter how long it lasts or how intensive it is, can minimize the systemic corruption in China.

440. David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crack-Up,” Wall Street Journal, March 6,
2015.

HUNTING THE CORRUPT “TIGERS” AND “FLIES” IN CHINA
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACA
AIC
CCDI
CCP
CMC
CPSU
CPI
CPIB
DIC
DSC
ICAC
KMT
MOS
NCPB
NDMC
NPC
PERC
PLA
PRC
PSC
SOE
SPP

Anti-Corruption Agency
Austerity Inspection Commission
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Chinese Communist Party
Central Military Commission
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Corruption Perceptions Index
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
Discipline Inspection Commission
Discipline Supervision Commission
Independent Commission Against Corruption
Kuomintang
Ministry of Supervision
National Corruption Prevention Bureau
National Defense Mobilization Committee
National People’s Congress
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy
People’s Liberation Army
People’s Republic of China
Politburo Standing Committee
State-Owned Enterprise
Supreme People’s Procuratorate

GLOSSARY OF SELECTED CHINESE NAMES
BO Xilai ⷧ⇊᮶
CHEN Liangyu 旰列⬯
CHEN Xitong 旰ⶴ⎴
CHEN Yun 旰ḹ
CHIANG Kai-shek ⶩ▼
DENG Xiaoping 总⮷⸛
GENG Biao ⪰梂
HU Jintao ⬌擎㵃
JIANG Zemin Ụ㲥㮹
LEE Hsien Loong ᮤ㗦潁
LEE Kuan Yew ᮤග⪀

LI Keqiang ᮤඞ笶
MAO Zedong ẟ㲥᷄
WANG Lijun ⋤❧⅃
WANG Qishan ⋤ᒱᒣ
WEN Jiabao ᐙᐆ
XI Jinping Ḉ役⸛
XI Zhongxun Ḉẚ≳
XU Caihou ᚎᡯཌ
ZHOU Enlai ࿘ᜠ᮶
ZHOU Yongkang ࿘Ọᗣ
ZHU Rongji ᮒ擽ᇶ
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